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I. Introduction 
The present Electronic Journal is one of the key products of the project entitled ‘Return directive 
DIALogue’ (REDIAL). The overall aim of the REDIAL Project is to facilitate horizontal judicial 
dialogue among EU Member State judges involved in return procedures.
1 
The starting premise of the REDIAL Project is that informed horizontal and vertical judicial 
interactions lead to the effective implementation of the Return Directive, and enhanced protection of 
the rights conferred by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and national constitutions. The REDIAL Project includes a toolkit aiming 
to provide information and solutions to the implementation of the Return Directive for legal 
practitioners. It includes:  
 a national Database comprising landmark national judgments on the interpretation and 
application of the Return Directive in all Member States. It offers, to date, an efficient search 
engine for over 1000 cases; 
 a European Database comprising the judgments delivered by the CJEU on the interpretation 
and application of the Return Directive. The database includes, in addition to the preliminary 
ruling, the preliminary reference addressed by the national court and the judgment delivered 
by the referring national courts following the preliminary ruling of the CJEU; 
 national reports including an overview of the relevant national legislation, administrative 
practice and jurisprudence for each of the main Chapters of the Return Directive; these 
Reports are drafted by the academics part of the REDIAL network, in collaboration with the 
national judges; 
 European synthesis reports, one for each of Chapters II-IV of the Return Directive. These offer 
a comprehensive analysis of the legal provisions of the Return Directive, relevant CJEU 
judgments and case law of Member States implementing EU law; the various issues in the 
interpretation and application of the Return Directive, best practices and the contribution of 
the national judiciaries are assessed; 
 an annotated Directive with references to the relevant case law of the Court of Justice and the 
ECtHR for each provision; 
 three editions of a freely accessible Electronic Journal, where the outcome of judicial 
interactions is revealed; 
 and a blog where academics and judges publish comments on recent domestic and European 
jurisprudence and/or legislative amendments. 
From a methodological point of view, the REDIAL Project relies upon close collaboration between 
judges and academics from the EU Member States. At the national level, judges are in charge of the 
selection of landmark judgments on the Return Directive. Academics, meanwhile, are responsible for 
synthesizing their added value in a national report. The jurisprudence is collected in three stages 
following the structure of the Return Directive. So, the first package covers the provisions of Chapter 
II of the Return Directive (Articles 7 to 11) dealing successively with the voluntary departure, removal 
                                                     
1 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally-staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24 December 2008 
(hereinafter Return Directive). The Directive does not apply in Ireland and the UK. Denmark did not take part in the 
adoption of the Directive and is not bound by it under EU law, but decided to implement the Directive as a measure 
building upon the Schengen acquis in its national law. The associated Schengen countries – Norway, Iceland, Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein – are bound by the Directive, under their Schengen Association Agreements. 
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and postponement of removal, return and removal of unaccompanied minors, and entry bans. The 
second package focused on Chapter III of the Return Directive (Articles 12-14) deals with procedural 
safeguards. The third package is to address Chapter IV (Articles 15-18) on detention for the purpose of 
removal. 
The REDIAL Project is run by the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and the Centre for Judicial 
Cooperation (CJC) of the European University Institute (EUI), together with the Academic Network 
for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum in Europe known as the ‘Odysseus Network’ 
coordinated by the Université Libre de Bruxelles. The MPC is in charge of scientific coordination, 
while the Odysseus Network provides, for the project, national expertise and its network of contacts 
throughout the EU, including contacts with judges. 
The present issue of the REDIAL Electronic Journal is the last one that will be published in the 
course of the REDIAL Project. The three REDIAL Electronic Journals deal, in order, with Chapters 
II, III and IV of the Return Directive (RD). The current, third edition, covers, then, Chapter IV of the 
Return Directive, addressing the most controversial provisions of the Directive: immigration (pre-
removal) detention.
2
 Article 15 RD allows detention for the return or removal procedure only on strict 
conditions, practically as a last resort. Its six paragraphs set out rules on: the legal grounds of 
detention; duration of pre-removal detention; competent bodies, remedies and standards of judicial 
control for pre-removal detention. 
Article 15 RD, third-country nationals (TCNs) subject to return procedures ‘may only’ be detained 
so as to prepare for ‘return and/or to carry out the removal process’ in particular when there is a ‘risk 
of absconding’ or if the person concerned ‘avoids or hampers’ the return or removal process. 
Detention is justified only if other sufficient but less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively, 
and only while removal arrangements ‘are in process and executed with due diligence’. 
Pre-removal detention, as a last resort return measure, can be ordered by administrative or judicial 
authorities, and must be ‘ordered in writing with reasons in fact and law’ (Article 15(2) RD). If the 
detention was ordered by administrative authorities, there must be some form of ‘speedy’ judicial 
review. The pre-removal detention is to be reviewed at regular periods, either automatically or at the 
request of the TCN concerned (Article 15(3) RD). If there is no ‘reasonable prospect of removal’ or 
the conditions for detention no longer exist, the TCN concerned must be released immediately (Article 
15(4) RD). Pre-removal detention shall be maintained as long as conditions exist; this shall not exceed, 
however, an initial period of six months (Article 15(5) RD). An exception , is where there is a lack of 
cooperation on the part of the person concerned or where there are delays in obtaining documentation 
(Article 15(6) RD): in these cases national law permits prolongation of this period of up to one extra 
year because the removal operation is likely to last longer. 
The pre-removal detention should, ‘as a rule’, take place in special facilities for migrants (Article 
16 RD). These special facilities should be separated from those where ordinary prisoners are detained 
(Article 17 RD). Article 16 RD also provides for specific norms on: the right of those detained to 
contact legal representatives, family members and consular authorities; the situation of vulnerable 
persons; the possibility for independent bodies to visit detention facilities; and for information to be 
given to migrants. (Article 16 RD) There are more detailed rules on the detention of minors and 
families (Article 17 RD), although Member States may derogate from certain aspects of the rules 
concerning speedy judicial review and detention conditions in ‘exceptional’ situations (Article 18 RD). 
In addition to these detailed norms set out in the Return Directive, additional rules are provided in 
EU primary law, such as the provisions of the EU Charter, but also the general principles of EU law, 
such as the principles of primary, direct effect, and the rights of defence. These norms were further 
interpreted and detailed by the CJEU, while complementary rules are set out by the ECtHR. Primary 
                                                     
2 Articles 15-18. See also, F. Lutz, The negotiations on the Return Directive, WLP, 2010, p. 67. 
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and secondary EU law, including the case-law of the CJEU and of the ECtHR in relation to Articles 5 
and 3 of the ECHR thus provide extensive and detailed standards and rules that should be applied in 
immigration detention cases. A slow, but gradual integration of these rules has been identified at the 
national level. However, according to the domestic jurisprudence collected by the REDIAL 
collaborating judges and academics, the level of implementation of those standards and rules in 
administrative and judicial practices is still unsatisfactory. Indeed there still are certain national 
legislative provisions and practices on pre-removal detention which persistently diverge from the 
provisions of the RD on pre-removal detention. 
The third REDIAL Electronic Journal aims to offer an overview of the contribution of judicial 
interactions in ensuring a coherent and uniform implementation of the RD in immigration detention 
cases. The selection of the cases was based on the criteria of showing successful judicial interaction. 
This can relate to direct interactions between national courts and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU); indirect interactions – referring to the CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence; and interaction 
among national judgments addressing similar issues. The Journal will map out various problems in the 
implementation of Chapter IV RD at national level and will give some sense of the solutions reached 
by national judgments inspired by judicial interactions. 
After this short introduction (I), the Journal offers a concise summary of the relevant preliminary 
rulings delivered by the CJEU with regard to the interpretation and application of Articles 15-18 RD, 
which are analysed in their national social and legal context. The impact of these preliminary rulings 
on the referring Member State, but also on other Member States’ legislation and practice is 
summarised. The relevant preliminary references are discussed here following the chronological path 
of the issues before the courts: issue(s) before the national courts; preliminary questions addressed to 
the CJEU; opinion of the Advocate General; follow-up judgment of the referring court; and impact of 
the preliminary ruling on other domestic judiciaries. These instances of vertical direct and indirect 
judicial interactions are structured on the following substantive issues: the criminalisation of irregular 
migration and the principles of necessity and proportionality of pre-removal detention (1); interaction 
between asylum detention and pre-removal detention (2); the right to an effective judicial protection of 
pre-removal detention (3); the use of specialised facilities as a general rule for detaining returnees 
(4); separation from ordinary prisoners (5). (II) 
The following parts (III-V) assess landmark national judgments on each of the Articles of Chapter 
IV RD for the purpose of evaluating: national judicial compliance with the CJEU’s preliminary 
rulings; judicial developments in the implementation of the Return Directive, as well as identifying 
areas where national courts have different or even divergent approaches on how judicial scrutiny 
should be carried out over the implementation of the Return Directive. This last section will illustrate 
the essential role of national courts in the clarification of the scope and meaning of Articles 15-18 of 
the Return Directive. 
In concrete, the third part (III) includes a comparative analysis of landmark judgments on the main 
issues under Article 15 RD. It will assess the main outcomes of vertical and horizontal judicial 
interaction on pre-removal detention. This section aims to discuss, comparatively, national 
jurisprudence on complex and controversial topics, such as: (1) distinguishing immigration detention 
under the Return Directive from the criminal imprisonment of irregular migrants, which will assess, 
inter alia, the impact of the El Dridi, Sagor and Achugbabian preliminary rulings on domestic 
jurisprudence; (2) the definition and implementation of the EU concept of ‘risk of absconding’; (3) 
other legal grounds for pre-removal detention; (4) judicial control of pre-removal detention; (5) the 
concept of the reasonable prospect of removal; (6) the duration of pre-removal detention; (7) 
prolongation of pre-removal detention; (8) re-detention; (9) alternative measures to pre-removal 
detention; (10) access to legal aid; (11) a summary of the impact of primary and secondary EU 
legislation and CJEU case law; and (12) a short overview of the outcomes of horizontal judicial 
interactions. 
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The fourth part (IV) focuses on the appropriateness of place and conditions of detention as 
provided by Article 16 RD. It analyses the impact of the main judicial interaction in this field (CJUE) 
on the jurisprudence of several national courts. In particular, EU law requirements on the material 
conditions and concrete safeguards in the national courts’ assessment of the lawfulness of pre-removal 
detention. 
The fifth part (V) reveals the overall lack of ‘dialogue’ between national and European judges 
regarding the detention of families and minors (Article 17 RD). It argues that further interaction 
among domestic courts dealing with similar issues would have probably led to a more effective 
understanding of the Directive and a better compliance with fundamental rights standards. 
The REDIAL Journal should hopefully be of interest to national and European judges specialised 
in migration law. However, it is also relevant to: national administrations in charge of return 
procedures; NGOs defending third-country nationals; specialized lawyers; and the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU.  
II. European Landmark Cases and their Impact on National Jurisprudence 
The CJEU has played a fundamental role in the development of a corpus iuris of standards in the 
application of immigration detention and migrant’s human rights and deserves some attention here. 
The Return Directive has been the object of an increasing number of preliminary references sent by 
national courts from various Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The majority of these preliminary references touched on pre-
removal detention measures,
3
 condition of detention,
4
 criminalisation of irregular entry/stay,
5
 and 
interaction between asylum and pre-removal detention.
6
 Several more cases are pending.
7
 The 
preliminary rulings are clustered in five sections: (1) the criminalisation of irregular migration and the 
principles of necessity and proportionality of pre-removal detention; (2) interaction between asylum 
detention and pre-removal detention; (3) the right to an effective judicial protection in the case of pre-
removal detention; (4) the use of specialised facilities as a general rule of detaining returnees; and (5) 
separation from ordinary prisoners. Each section will summarise the legal, social and factual context 
of the preliminary reference, the conclusions reached by the CJEU and briefly present the impact of 
each preliminary ruling on the legislation and jurisprudence of the referring Member State, but also on 
other Member States. It is important to summarise the CJEU preliminary rulings on pre-removal 
detention since the Court derived human rights imperatives not clearly found in the RD, which impose 
new duties on Member States, amounting, in effect, to procedural safeguards for third-country 
nationals. Disrespect of these standards might result not only in infringement procedures against the 
Member States, but possibly also in violations found by the ECtHR (see, for instance Nabil and others 
v. Hungary
8
). 
                                                     
3 C-146/14 (PPU) Mahdi; C-383/13 (PPU) G. & R; C-357/09 (PPU) Kadzoev. 
4 C-473/13 & C-514/13 Bero & Bouzalmate; C-474/13 Pham. 
5 CJEU C-290/14 Celaj ; C-430/11 Sagor; C-329/11 Achughbabian; C-61/11 (PPU) El Dridi. 
6 CJEU C-47/15 Affum. 
7 C-181/16 Gnandi; C-184/16 Petrea; C-199/16 Nianga; C-82/16 K.. These preliminary references touch mostly on the scope 
of application of the Return Directive in combined administrative procedures, entry bans, and right to be heard in 
combined proceedings (return proceedings following rejected asylum applications). 
8 Due to the lack of a judicial scrutiny by the domestic courts who failed to assess the specific circumstances of the case, 
concrete assessment of the risk of absconding, alternative measures, and the applicants’ personal situation the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 5(1) ECHR.  
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1. Criminalisation of irregular migration and the principles of necessity and proportionality in 
pre-removal detention 
C-61/11, El Dridi, CJEU Judgment of 28 April 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:268 
Compatibility of national legislation providing for a prison sentence for illegally staying third-
country nationals in the event of refusal to obey an order to leave the territory of a Member State – 
prohibition of criminal imprisonment on the sole grounds that the TCN remains in the territory 
without valid grounds. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Corte d’Appello di Trento (Italy, Court of 
Appeal of Trento) 
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr. El Dridi, who was sentenced to one year’s 
imprisonment for the offence of having stayed illegally on Italian territory without valid grounds, 
contrary to a removal order made against him by the Chief of Police (Questore). Mr El Dridi stayed 
illegally in Italy between May 2004 presumably until May 2010, when he was found by the police 
in Udine without valid documents. As the police could not enforce an immediate coercive 
deportation (because of lack of transport capacity)
 
and could not place him in an administrative 
detention centre (because there were no places available), it issued a removal order. Mr El Dridi did 
not comply with the police order and was prosecuted for this under Article 14(5) letter c of the 
Aliens Law. In the first phase of the proceeding before the Tribunal of Trento, Mr El Dridi was 
declared guilty and sentenced to one year in prison. On 2 February 2011, during the phase of appeal, 
the Appeal Court referred a preliminary ruling to the CJEU and, it asked for application of the 
urgent procedure under Article 104(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU as Mr El Dridi was 
still in detention.  
Legal and social background: The preliminary reference is part of a high number of similar 
preliminary questions addressed by Italian courts in the first half of 2011 (11 other preliminary 
references).
9
 Law 95 of 15 July 2009 amended Italian Aliens law by criminalising any illegal entry 
and stay, and providing a criminal fine ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 Euros; it extended the 
maximum period of migrants’ administrative detention from 60 days to 180 days; and it introduced, 
in Article 14(5), a criminal sanction of detention from one to five years for those foreign nationals 
who, despite having received a removal order from the police, were found on Italian territory 
without documents.
10
 By introducing these criminal sanctions, the Italian government considered 
the Return Directive to not be applicable, since the derogation provided in Article 2(b) RD would 
apply. However, first, as pointed out later by the CJEU, the Italian legislation stipulated immediate 
forced returns as the general rule, without giving precedence to the voluntary return measure; 
secondly, Italian legislation prohibited the re-entry of the irregular migrant for ten years, while the 
                                                     
9 Giudice di Pace di Mestre, Asad Abdallah, Case C-144/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Milano, Assane 
Samb, C-43/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Demba Ngagne, C-140/11, OJ 2008 L 
348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Treviso, Elena Vermisheva, C-187/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Corte D’Appello 
Di Trento, Hassen El Dridi, alias Karim Soufi, Case C-61/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. (2011); Tribunale di Bergamo, 
Ibrahim Music, C-156/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Rovereto, John Austine, Case C-63/11, OJ 2008 
L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Ivrea, Lucky Emegor, Case C-50/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di 
Ragusa, Mohamed Ali Cherni, Case C-113/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Ragusa, Mohamed Mrad, C-
60/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Frosinone, Patrick Conteh, C-169/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); 
Tribunale di Bergamo, Survival Godwin, C-94/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011); Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua 
Vetere, Yeboah Kwadwo, Case C-120/11, OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 (2011). 
10 See Article 14(5) letter c of the Alien Law: “A foreign national who is the recipient of the expulsion order referred to in 
paragraph 5b and a new removal order as referred to in paragraph 5a and who remains illegally on the territory of the 
State shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of between one and five years. In any event, the provisions of the third and 
last sentences of paragraph 5b shall apply”. And Article 14(5) letter d of the same law: “Where the offences referred to in 
the first sentence of paragraph 5b and paragraph 5c are committed, the rito direttissimo [expedited procedure] shall be 
followed and the arrest of the perpetrator shall be mandatory”. 
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Directive provided for a maximum ban of five years; thirdly, detention of the irregular migrants was 
the norm rather than the exception. 
Legal provision at issue: Articles 15 and 16 read in conjunction with Article 8(1) and (4) RD, and 
Article 14(5)(c) of the Italian Aliens Law. 
Questions addressed by the national court: in the light of the principle of sincere cooperation and 
proportionality, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115 preclude the possibility that criminal 
penalties (here prison sentence of up to four years) may be imposed in respect of a breach of an 
intermediate stage in the administrative return procedure, before that procedure is completed, by 
having recourse to the most severe administrative measure of constraint which remains available?  
Conclusion of the CJEU: The CJEU started by clarifying an issue regarding the applicability of the 
RD. It recalled that under Article 2(2)(b) RD, Member States may decide not to apply the Directive 
to third-country nationals subjected to a removal as a criminal sanction. But the court added an 
important nuance, namely, that the criminal legislation and rules of criminal procedure should not 
jeopardize the objectives pursued by Union law as that would deprive the Directive of its 
effectiveness.  
Secondly, the Court clarified that Articles 15 and 16 of the RD are clear, precise and unconditional 
and thus enjoy direct effect. They can thus be invoked by individuals in order to claim the 
disapplication of national law, especially since the Italian government failed to implement the 
Directive within the prescribed time. The CJEU continued by addressing the specific issue of the 
compatibility of Article 14 of the Aliens law with Articles 15 and 16 RD. It held that when Member 
States refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure or where the obligation to return has 
not been complied with within the period for voluntary departure, coercive measures can be used. 
However, in accordance with Articles 8(1) and (4) RD, those provisions require that the Member 
State must act in a proportionate manner and with due respect for, inter alia, fundamental rights, 
when ensuing effective return procedures. 
In a situation where such measures have not led to the expected result being attained, namely, the 
removal of the third-country national against whom they were issued, Member States remain free to 
adopt measures, including criminal law measures, aimed inter alia at dissuading those nationals 
from remaining illegally on those States’ territory. That being said, Member States may not, in order 
to remedy the failure of coercive measures adopted in order to carry out forced removal pursuant to 
Article 8(4) RD, provide for a custodial sentence, on the sole grounds that a third-country national 
continues to stay illegally on the territory of a Member State after an order to leave the national 
territory was notified to him and the period granted in that order has expired; rather, they must 
pursue their efforts to enforce the return decision, which continues to produce its effects. Indeed, 
such a penalty, due, inter alia, to its conditions and the methods of application, risks jeopardising 
the attainment of the objective pursued by that Directive. The CJEU emphasised that national courts 
are called upon not to apply such provisions and to “take into account the principle of the retroactive 
application of more lenient penalties.” 
The judgment is also important as it establishes a mandatory order of measures to be followed in 
return proceedings, which should go from the least coercive – granting the individual a period for 
voluntary departure – to the most coercive, pre-removal detention. Where Member States have not 
followed this procedure, third-country nationals who are being detained must be released, as that 
detention is unlawful. 
AG Opinion: View of J.Mazàk, 1 April 2011 
CJEU Judgment: First Chamber, 28 April 2011 
Case Affum (C-47/15) – Clarification of the El Dridi rules 
The CJEU extended the application of the El Dridi judgment, where it prohibited the application 
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criminal imprisonment merely on account of illegal entry to a third-country national to whom the 
return procedure has not been applied, also to illegal entry across an internal border, resulting in 
illegal stays. That interpretation also applies where the third-country national concerned may be 
taken back by another Member State pursuant to an agreement or arrangement within the meaning 
of Article 6(3) RD. 
Impact of the CJEU preliminary ruling: 
Impact on the Italian jurisprudence (the referring Member State): On the very same day as the 
publication of the El Dridi judgment, the Corte di Cassazione acquitted three undocumented 
migrants prosecuted under Article 14(5), confirming and reaffirming the principles stated at the 
supranational level. As to national legislation the reaction was also particularly fast in the political 
sphere: only a couple of months later, in June 2011, the Italian legislator adopted a new Law to 
ensure that the national return system was compatible with the principles established by the Return 
Directive and the CJEU.
11
 
Impact on national jurisprudence from Member States other than the referring one: El Dridi is 
by far the most commonly cited CJEU ruling by national courts dealing with return related decisions 
and pre-removal detention. It is usually invoked in order to determine whether an applicant is 
covered or not by the RD (e.g. Cyprus); as norm setting for the maximum duration of the pre-
removal detention period (e.g. Romania); or for assessing the proportionality of detention and the 
feasibility of less coercive measures (e.g. Bulgaria). 
Limited application of the El Dridi jurisprudence to assess the legality of pre-removal 
detention: Some of the national courts appear unwilling to apply the El Dridi principles to instances 
where the facts are not precisely the same as those in the El Dridi case. For instance, an applicant 
who had been convicted of illegal work and illegal stay was found, by the Cypriot Supreme Court, 
to fall outside the scope of the RD because his conviction was not the result of a failure to comply 
with a deportation order as was the situation in the El Dridi case.
12
 The Court ordered the 
applicant’s release relying on ECtHR case law (Quinn v. France A-311 (1995); Chachal v. UK 
(1996)) rather than on El Dridi, which suggests an unwillingness to endorse the principle that 
immigration should not be criminalized.
13
 
 
                                                     
11 Decreto-Legge 89, Disposizioni urgenti per il completamento dell’attuazione della Direttiva 2004/38/CE sulla libera 
circolazione dei cittadini comunitari e per il recepimento della direttiva 2008/115/CE sul rimpatrio dei cittadini di Paesi 
terzi irregolari, 23 Giugno 2011, 11G0128. See more in V. Passalacqua, “El Dridi upside down: a case of legal 
mobilization for undocumented migrants’ rights in Italy”, paper presented at The Research Group Government & Law of 
the University of Antwerp Doctoral Conference on Democratic legitimacy without Parliament: fact or fiction? 
12 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re the application of Laal Badh Shah, Civil Application No. 6/2014, 11 February 2014, available on:  
http://cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2014/1-201402-6-
14.htm&qstring=Laal%20and%20Badh%20and%20Shah 
13 See more in the Cypriot REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention. 
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C-329/11, Achughbabian, CJEU Judgment of 6 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:807 
Compatibility of national legislation making provisions, in the event of illegal stays, for a sentence of 
imprisonment and a fine with the Return Directive; the criminal imprisonment of an illegally-staying 
third-country national is possible only after he or she has been subject to the coercive measures 
provided for in the directive and after the expiry of the maximum duration of that detention. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Court d’Appel de Paris (France, Court of 
Appeal of Paris)  
Factual context: dispute between Mr Achughbabian and the Prefect of Val-de-Marne concerning 
Mr Achughbabian’s illegal stay on French territory. Being suspected of committing and 
continuing to commit the offence set out in Article L. 621-1 of Ceseda (i.e. having entered or 
residing in France without complying with the provisions of Articles L. 211-1 and L. 311-1 and/or 
remaining in France beyond the period authorised by a previous visa) Mr Achughbabian was 
placed in police custody. 
Legal and social background: Similarly to the Italian legislation at issue in the El Dridi case, the 
French system at the time of the Achugbabian case punished the irregular stay of aliens on French 
territory with a criminal prison sentence of at least one year imprisonment.
14
 During this period of 
police custody, the irregular TCNs were placed in detention together with persons convicted as 
criminals. 
Questions addressed by the national court: Taking into account its scope, does Directive 
2008/115/EC preclude national legislation, such as Article L.621-1 of the French Code on the entry 
and stay of foreign nationals and on the right to asylum, which provides for the imposition of a 
sentence of imprisonment on a third-country national on the sole grounds of his illegal entry or 
residence in national territory? 
Legal provision at issue: Article 8 RD 
Conclusion of the CJEU: As a principle, Directive 2008/115 does not preclude national legislation 
which classifies an illegal stay by a third-country national as an offence and provides for penal 
sanctions, such as: a term of imprisonment, to prevent such a stay, or the detention of a third-
country national in order to determine whether or not his stay is legal. Nevertheless, during the 
course of the procedure provided for by the Directive, the imposition and enforcement of a sentence 
of imprisonment appears more problematic as it is likely to “delay the removal’’ and to infringe the 
requirements of effectiveness referred to, for example, in recital 4 of Directive 2008/115.  
The CJEU recalls that criminal sentences “do not contribute to the carrying through of the removal 
which that procedure is intended to achieve, namely, the physical transportation of the person 
concerned out of the Member State concerned. Such a sentence does not therefore constitute a 
‘measure’ or a ‘coercive measure’ within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2008/115.” 
Therefore, it precludes criminal penalties for illegal stays, in so far as that legislation permits the 
imprisonment of a third-country national who, “though staying illegally in the territory of the said 
Member State and not being willing to leave that territory voluntarily, has not been subject to the 
coercive measures referred to in Article 8 of that Directive and has not, being placed in detention 
with a view to the preparation and carrying out of his removal, yet reached the end of the maximum 
term of that detention.” This finding does not apply to the imprisonment of a third-country national 
to whom the return procedure established by the said directive has been applied and who is staying 
illegally in that territory with no justified grounds for non-return. 
                                                     
14 Article 63 French Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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AG Opinion: View of AG Mazak 
CJEU Judgment: Grand Chamber, 6 December 2011 
Impact of the CJEU preliminary ruling: 
Impact on French jurisprudence (the referring Member State): The French Court of Cassation
15
 
decided, in July of the year following the CJEU preliminary ruling that aliens cannot be placed in 
police custody for the sole reason that they are suspected of staying irregularly in French territory. 
The highest French court expressly referred to the preliminary rulings of the CJEU in El Dridi and 
Achugbabian. 
Impact on the administrative practice and French legislation (the referring Member State): 
following the judgment of the French Court of Cassation, the Ministry of Interior issued a Circular 
providing instructions on the placements of aliens in public custody solely for being in the country 
illegally. On 31 December 2012, a Law (2012-1560) was adopted reforming the regime of detention 
of aliens in France. Namely, the detention could last for up to sixteen hours. At the end of this 
specific period, third-country nationals can be either released (if they are found to be staying legally 
in France) or placed in an administrative detention centre to await expulsion or deportation.
16
 
Impact on national jurisprudence from other Member States than the referring one: the judgment 
is commonly referred to for establishing an obligation of carrying out an individual assessment in 
cases of irregular stay or entry; and of taking into account the individual behaviour of the TCN (e.g. 
Bulgaria). 
C-430/11, Sagor, CJEU Judgment of 6 December 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:777 
Compatibility of national legislation providing for a fine which may be replaced by an order for 
expulsion or home detention with the Return Directive; An illegal stay by a third-country national in a 
Member State: (1) can be penalised by means of a fine, which may be replaced by an expulsion order; 
(2) cannot be penalised by means of a home detention order unless that order is terminated as soon as 
the physical transportation of the TCN out of that MS is possible. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Tribunale di Rovigo (Italy, Tribunal of Rovigo) 
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr Sagor concerning his illegal stay in Italy. In 2010, 
Mr Sagor was summoned before the Tribunale di Rovigo (District Court, Rovigo) for the offence of 
illegal entry or stay, as referred to in Italian legislation. That Court found that the offence of illegal 
stay had been duly proven. This offence is according to the Law punishable by a “fine of between 
EUR 5,000 and EUR 10,000”. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 8(1) and (4) RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: in the light of the principles of sincere cooperation 
and effectiveness, do Articles 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of Directive 2008/115 preclude the possibility that a 
third-country national who is considered by the Member State to be illegally staying there may be 
liable to a fine for which home detention is substituted by way of criminal law sanction, solely as a 
consequence of that person’s illegal entry and stay? What is the impact of Articles 2, 15 and 16 RD 
on the possibility for Member States to enact legislation which provides that a third-country national 
                                                     
15 Cass. 1re civ., 5 July 2012, n° 11.30-530: JurisData n° 2012-014965. 
16 For a detailed commentary of the legislation reform, see A. Beduschi, “Detention of Undocumented and the Judicial 
Impact of the CJEU’s Decisions in France”, available on: 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/16750/Detention%20of%20Undocumented%20Immigrants%2
0and%20the%20Judicial%20Impact%20of%20the%20CJEUs%20Decisions%20in%20France%20FINAL%20FOR%20S
UBMISSION.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.  
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who is considered to be illegally staying there, may be liable for a fine for which an enforceable 
order for expulsion with immediate effect is substituted by way of criminal-law sanction?  
Legal and social background: After the El Dridi preliminary ruling, the reformed Italian Aliens 
Law maintained illegal stay as a criminal offence punished by pecuniary penalties. 
Conclusion of the CJEU: The Court has already had occasion to state that common standards and 
procedures established by the RD would be undermined if, after establishing that a TCN is staying 
illegally, the Member State were to preface the implementation of the return decision, or even the 
adoption of that decision, with a criminal prosecution which could lead to a term of imprisonment 
during the course of the return procedure. Such a step would risk delaying the removal. However, 
legislation which provides for a criminal prosecution, which can lead to a fine for which an 
expulsion order may be substituted, has markedly different effects from legislation providing for a 
criminal prosecution: criminal prosecution may lead to a term of imprisonment during the course of 
the return procedure. The possibility that that criminal prosecution leads to a fine will hardly impede 
the return procedure established by the RD and, so, is not in itself, prohibited EU Law.  
As for a fine, for which a home detention order may be substituted, the RD precludes Member State 
legislation which allows illegal stays by TCNs to be penalised by means of a home detention order 
without guaranteeing that the enforcement of that order must come to an end as soon as the physical 
transportation of the individual concerned out of that Member State is possible.  
AG Opinion: / 
CJEU Judgment: First Chamber, 6 December 2012 
Impact of the CJEU preliminary ruling: 
Impact on the Italian legislation (the referring Member State): reform of the Italian Aliens Law in 
2014, making illegal entry or stay an administrative offence. Law No. 67/2014 delegated to the 
government to repeal the criminal offense for illegal entry/stay (before 17 November 2015), turning 
it into an administrative offense, and preserving criminal charges to the conduct of violation of 
administrative measures adopted on the matter. In practice, only the first entry will be de-
penalized.
17
 
Impact on national jurisprudence from other Member States than the referring one: in relation to 
the individual approach in assessing the risk of absconding (e.g. Bulgaria). 
C-522/11, Mbaye, CJEU Judgment of 21 March 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:190 
Compatibility of national legislation penalising illegal residence with criminal fine with the Return 
Directive 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Giudice di pace di Lecce (Italy, Justice of the 
Peace of Lecce)  
Factual context: proceedings brought against Mr Mbaye concerning his illegal stay in Italy. This 
case, among others, has been referred to the CJEU concerning the imprisonment of third-country 
nationals in return procedures for the crime of irregular entry or stay.  
Legal provision at issue: Article 2(2)(b) and 8 RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: Does the Directive 2008/115 preclude the application 
of the present legislation – Article 10bis of legislative Decree286/1998 – punishing irregular entry 
and stay by immediate expulsion? Additionally, are penal sanctions solely for the irregular presence 
                                                     
17 See Italian REDIAL country Report on the judicial implementation of Chapter II RD, p. 2. 
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of the third-country national in the territory, admissible in the meaning of the Return Directive, 
regardless of a fully achieved return procedure established by the said directive? 
Conclusion: The Directive 2008/115 does not preclude Member State legislation, such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, sanctioning the illegal residence of third-country nationals by a fine 
which can be replaced by a penalty of expulsion, provided that such a replacement is only used 
when the applicant’s situation corresponds to one of those referred to in Article 7, paragraph 4, of 
this Directive 
AG Opinion: / 
CJEU Judgment: (Third Chamber) of 21 March 2013, FR – unpublished decision 
2. Interaction between asylum detention and pre-removal detention 
C-357/09, PPU Kadzoev, CJEU Judgment of 30 November 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:741 
Period of detention; taking into account the period during which the execution of a removal decision 
was suspended; concept of ‘reasonable prospect of removal’: Only a real prospect that removal can 
be carried out successfully, having regard to the periods laid down in Article 15(5) and (6), 
corresponds to a reasonable prospect of removal, no reasonable prospect exists where it appears 
unlikely that the person concerned will be admitted to a third country, within those periods. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
Factual context: This judgment concerns the detention pending removal by Bulgarian authorities of 
a third-country national, whose name, birthplace and nationality were disputed. Detention began on 
3 November 2006. Bulgarian authorities corresponded with Russian authorities over a Russian birth 
certificate and a Chechen temporary identity card. The Russian authorities disputed the authenticity 
of the evidence and refused to accept his Russian nationality, hence preventing the removal. 
Between 31 May 2007 and 10 July 2009, the third-country national applied for refugee status three 
times and was rejected each time. In June and October 2008, he applied for his detention to be 
converted into a less coercive alternative, namely regular reporting to the police authorities, but 
these requests were rejected as he had no actual address in Bulgaria. The proceedings culminated in 
the Supreme Administrative Court declaring him ‘stateless’ as his identity and nationality could not 
be determined. UNHCR and Amnesty found it credible that the man was a victim of ill-treatment in 
his country of origin. None of the attempts to obtain travel documents and get a safe third country to 
accept him were successful and, at the time of the Grand Chamber’s judgment, the individual was 
still in detention. The proceedings in which the preliminary reference arose concerned the continued 
detention of a third-country national which continued after the transposition of the Return Directive 
in Bulgaria, which amended national legislation governing time limits on and specific grounds for 
immigration detention. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 15 RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: ‘1. Must Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 
2008/115 … be interpreted as meaning that: 
(a) where the national law of the Member State did not provide for a maximum period of detention 
or grounds for extending such detention before the transposition of the requirements of that 
directive and, on transposition of the directive, no provision was made for conferring a retroactive 
effect on the new provisions, the requirements of the directive only apply and cause the period to 
start to run from their transposition into the national law of the Member State? 
(b) within the periods laid down for detention in a specialised facility with a view to removal within 
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the meaning of the directive, no account is to be taken of the period during which the execution of a 
removal decision from the Member State under an express provision was suspended owing to a 
pending request for asylum by a third-country national, where during that procedure he continued to 
remain in that specialised detention facility, if the national law of the Member State so permits? 
2. Must Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 … be interpreted as meaning that, within the 
periods laid down for detention in a specialised facility with a view to removal within the meaning 
of that directive, no account is to be taken of the period during which execution of a decision of 
removal from the Member State was suspended under an express provision on the grounds that an 
appeal against that decision is pending? This is despite the fact that during the period of that 
procedure the third-country national has continued to stay in that specialised detention facility, 
where he did not have valid identity documents and there is therefore some doubt as to his identity 
or where he does not have any means of supporting himself or where he has demonstrated 
aggressive conduct. 
3. Must Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115… be interpreted as meaning that removal is not 
reasonably possible where: 
(a) at the time when a judicial review of the detention is conducted, the State of which the person is 
a national has refused to issue him with a travel document for his return and there had been no 
agreement with a third country in order to secure the person’s entry there even though the 
administrative bodies of the Member State are continuing to make endeavours to that end? 
(b) at the time when a judicial review of the detention is conducted there was an agreement for 
readmission between the European Union and the State of which the person is a national, but, owing 
to the existence of new evidence, namely the person’s birth certificate, the Member State did not 
refer to the provisions of that agreement, if the person concerned does not wish to return? 
(c) the possibilities of extending the detention periods provided for in Article 15(6) of the directive 
have been exhausted in a situation where no agreement for readmission has been reached with the 
third country at the time when a judicial review of his detention is conducted, with regard to Article 
15(6)(b) of the directive? 
4. Must Article 15(4) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 … be interpreted as meaning that if, at the time 
when the detention with a view to removal of the third-country national is reviewed, there is found 
to be no reasonable grounds for removing him and the grounds for extending his detention have 
been exhausted, in such a case: 
(a) it is none the less not appropriate to order his immediate release if the following conditions are 
all met: the person concerned does not have valid identity documents, whatever the duration of their 
validity, with the result that there is a doubt as to his identity; he is aggressive in his conduct; he has 
no means of supporting himself; and there is no third person who has undertaken to provide for his 
subsistence? 
(b) as to the decision on release it must be asked whether, under the provisions of the national law 
of the Member State, the third-country national has the resources necessary to stay in the Member 
State as well as an address at which he may reside?’ 
Conclusion of the CJEU: As to the calculation of the period of detention, the CJEU recalls that the 
detention of asylum seekers is governed by Directive 2003/9/EC and that, as a rule, they should not be 
detained. If a third-country national were to be detained as an asylum seeker, this should have 
happened on the basis of a new decision and in accordance with that Directive. If this were not the 
case, meaning that the third-country national was being kept in detention on the basis of the same 
decision, then the period of examination of the asylum application must be included in the calculation 
of pre-removal detention (paras. 41-48). As to the extension of the period of detention, the Court 
recalled that the suspension of removal for judicial review is not mentioned as grounds for extension 
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of detention by the RD. The period of judicial review should be taken into account. (paras. 51-54). 
On the concept of the reasonable prospect of removal, the CJEU concluded that only a real prospect 
that the removal can be carried out successfully, for the periods laid down in Article 15(5) and (6) 
RD, corresponds to a reasonable prospect of removal, and that that reasonable prospect does not 
exist where it appears unlikely that the person concerned will be admitted to a third country, having 
regard to those periods. When the maximum period of detention has already expired, the individual 
has to be released immediately, and it is considered as if there is no reasonable prospect of removal. 
The CJEU clarified that the period of eighteen months provided by the RD is a maximum period 
which cannot be exceeded by the Member States. The TCN can no longer be detained after eighteen 
months. (paras. 60-62). 
The Court also clarified that detention on the basis of the Directive is not possible on the grounds of 
public order considerations. (para. 70) 
AG Opinion: View of AG Mazak 
CJEU Judgment: Grand Chamber, Judgment of 30 November 2009 
Impact of the preliminary ruling: 
Impact on national legislation of Bulgaria (the referring Member State): The most fundamental 
change is the introduction of a time limit to the length of detention (see, e.g., the Kadzoev case, C-
357/09 PPU, following a preliminary ruling request by the Sofia City Administrative Court). 
Previously no time limit to immigration detention existed in Bulgaria and detention could last for 
years. Before the adoption of the RD, Bulgarian law provided that immigration detention lasted 
“until the obstacles for the execution of the removal order ceased to exist”.18  
Impact on national jurisprudence of Bulgaria (the referring Member State): the Kadzoev 
judgment is taken into consideration in cases on differentiation between the legal regimes of 
detention of irregular TCN under the Return Directive and detention of asylum seekers under the 
Reception Conditions Directive. 
Impact on the national jurisprudence of Member States other than the referring one: the Kadzoev 
judgment is invoked in relation to calculating the starting point for the pre-removal detention period, 
when asylum detention also occurred (e.g. Swedish Migration Court of Appeal, UM10615-12); or 
as norm setting for the maximum ceiling of detention foreseen in the RD (18 months), which would 
require that the detainee must be released (e.g. Cypriot Supreme Court, Laal Badh Shah case).  
C-534/11, Arslan, CJEU Judgment of 30 May 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:343 
Applicability to asylum seekers; possibility of keeping a third-country national in detention after an 
application for asylum has been made; the RD does not apply from the submission of an asylum 
application until the end of this procedure. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Nejvyšší správní soud (Supreme Administrative 
Court of the Czech Republic) 
Factual context: Mr Arslan is a Turkish national who was arrested and detained in the Czech 
Republic with a view to removal. He lodged an asylum application while in detention under the 
domestic legislation implementing the Return Directive. His detention was extended to 60 days due 
to a presumption that he will obstruct the enforcement of removal. This presumption was based on 
past conduct: irregular entry, evading border controls, irregular stay in Austria and the Czech 
Republic, and the fact that, in spite of having been already returned by Greece to Turkey, he had 
                                                     
18 According to the Bulgarian CONTENTION country Report. 
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come back to the EU. Although he lodged an asylum application, Mr Arslan’s detention was 
extended to a further 120 days on the grounds of the removal procedure. He challenged this 
extension as unlawful, since he argued there was no reasonable prospect of enforcing his removal 
due to the fact that he would take advantage of all available remedies. In support of his claim he 
relied on Article 15(1) and (4) RD and ECtHR jurisprudence.  
Legal context: The ‘pre-Arslan’ practice in the Czech Republic was as follows: if a TCN applied 
for international protection while being in pre-removal detention, there was no automatic immediate 
review of the prospect of his removal; this review took place only when the initial detention 
decision expired and the Police had to decide whether to prolong the detention or not. 
Legal provision at issue: Art. 15 RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: The referring court sought an answer first, on whether 
the Return Directive applies to an illegally staying third-country national who makes an application 
for asylum within the meaning of Directive 2005/85 and, second, whether such an application 
necessarily puts an end to his detention for the purpose of removal on the basis of the Return 
Directive. 
According to the AG, the questions addressed by the referring court raise the issue that the asylum 
provisions might be used as a tool to render application of the Return Directive ineffective 
1. Should Article 2(1), in conjunction with recital 9 of the preamble, of Directive 2008/115/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals be interpreted to 
mean that this Directive does not apply to a third-country national who has applied for international 
protection within the meaning of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status?  
2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must the detention of a foreign national for 
the purpose of return be terminated if he applies for international protection within the meaning of 
Directive 2005/85/EC when there are no other reasons for keeping him in detention?  
Advocate General: AG Wathelet Opinion 
Conclusion of the CJEU: In its ruling, the CJEU clarified that an asylum seeker ceases to come 
within the scope of the Return Directive, until a final negative decision has been made on his 
application for asylum. The Court recalled that in Kadzoev it had already established that detention 
for the purpose of the removal and detention of asylum seekers falls under different legal rules.  
As regards the second question addressed by the referring court raising the issue of abuse of asylum 
application for the purpose of evading pre-removal detention, the Court held that the submission of 
an asylum application, at a time the individual is subject to a return decision and is being detained 
on the basis of Article 15 RD, “does not allow it to be presumed, without an assessment on a case-
by-case basis of all the relevant circumstances, that he has made that application solely to delay or 
jeopardise the enforcement of the return decision and that it is objectively necessary and 
proportionate to maintain detention.” If a third-country national who is detained on the basis of the 
Return Directive submits an application for asylum, detention ordered on the basis of that directive 
must be terminated. He can however be detained under the asylum rules, “after an assessment on a 
case-by-case basis of all the relevant circumstances, that the application was made solely to delay or 
jeopardise the enforcement of the return decision and that it is objectively necessary to maintain 
detention to prevent the person concerned from permanently evading his return.” The Court did not 
provide examples or further criteria to help in distinguishing between situations where the third-
country national is merely exercising his rights from those where he is abusing EU derived rights. 
The AG, on the other hand, provided helpful guidelines for national courts on how to identify 
situations of abuse of rights:  
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77. “[…] the individual and specific circumstances of each case must be carefully examined in 
detail by the national courts in order to draw a distinction between ‘taking advantage of a possibility 
conferred by law and an abuse of rights’.  
78. As part of that examination, the referring court could take into consideration, inter alia, the 
following evidence in the present case: 
– Mr Arslan’s previous illegal entries into the territories of several Member States without any 
mention of an application for asylum; 
– the fact that Mr Arslan clearly stated that in seeking asylum his intention was to bring about an 
end to his detention through demonstrating that, by using all the remedies having suspensive effect 
that the procedure of applying for asylum could offer him, his detention would necessarily extend 
beyond the maximum period allowed by national law, which removed from the outset any 
reasonable prospect of the removal process succeeding; and 
– the fact that Mr Arslan immediately disappeared following his release and, as may be inferred 
from the observations made at the hearing by the Czech Government, did not continue the 
procedure of applying for asylum.” 
CJEU Judgment: (Third Chamber) of 30 May 2013 
The J.N. case (C-601/15) – Clarification of the CJEU reasoning in Kadzoev and Arslan cases 
The Court concluded that in instances where an asylum application is filed by a third-country 
national subject to pre-removal detention, the removal procedure should be “resumed at the stage at 
which it was interrupted.” (para. 75) This was deduced from the obligation of Member States to 
carry out the removal as soon as possible. (para. 76) 
Impact of the preliminary ruling: 
Impact on national legislation/policy of the referring Member State: 30 days before the CJEU 
delivered its judgment in Arslan, the Czech legislator adopted Law No. 103/2013, whereby if a third-
country national – who is detained under Aliens Act – lodges an application for international 
protection, the Police must issue a new detention order within five days if they intend to prolong the 
detention measure. Once this new ‘asylum detention’ order is issued, the initial ‘pre-return detention’ 
order becomes automatically void. Further analysis of the legislative amendments following the 
Arslan preliminary ruling can be found in the Czech REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention, p. 5. 
Impact on the jurisprudence from the referring Member State: In spite of the aforementioned 
legislative amendment, the problem in practice was that the reasons for the detention of a third-
country national under the Asylum Act did not cover all situations under the Alien’s Act. Hence the 
Supreme Administrative Court had to decide whether in the cases, when Art. 46a Asylum Act is not 
applicable, a new detention decision under the Aliens Act must be issued or whether it is enough to 
review the initial detention decision internally without issuing a new decision. The Supreme 
Administrative Court eventually opted for the former and held that, despite the fact the Aliens Act 
does not stipulate such a process, a new decision on detention must be issued; other interpretations 
would be inconsistent with the CJEU’s Arslan judgment (see e.g. Judgment No. 1 As 90/2011-124). 
Impact on national jurisprudence from other Member States than the referring one: the CJEU 
ruling in Arslan has also had an important impact on national case law beyond the referring country 
of origin: 
(Bulgaria) – the Arslan ruling is the referring judgment in cases concerning differentiation between 
the legal regimes of detention of irregular TCN under the Return Directive and the detention of 
asylum seekers under the Reception Conditions Directive (see for instance the case of Geyan 
Syudits). 
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(Italy) – In this sense, the Court of Rome adopted a noteworthy judgment giving effect to the 
principles set out in the Arslan case. In this case, the TCN, who came from Nigeria, was rescued at 
sea when trying to reach Italian territory without a travel document or visa. He was immediately 
issued a return decision based on Article 10(2)(b) of the Consolidated Text on Immigration and was 
subsequently detained in an Identification and Expulsion Centre, even though he had asked for 
international protection at the very moment of the entry. Due to his asylum application, he was not 
supposed to be detained in an Identification and Expulsion Centre, but in an Accommodation Centre 
for asylum seekers (so-called CARA, under Art. 20 (2)(d), d.lgs. no. 25/2008 of transposition of 
Directive 2005/85/EC). The Justice of the Peace, however, validated his detention. As a result of his 
asylum application, the Civil Court became competent for deciding on the extension of his 
detention, which led to a more rigorous examination of the lawfulness of continuing detention. The 
Civil Court thus decided – with reference to Arslan – that the detention could not be prolonged. The 
judge based the decision on two main arguments: first, the application for international protection 
had not been made after the detention order but at the moment of entry and therefore, it could not be 
considered as having been made to delay the enforcement of the return decision; and second, the 
request for renewal submitted by the Questore (the Police Commissioner) lacked any of the criteria 
set out by the CJEU in Arslan. 
(Slovenia) – The Slovenian Administrative Court referred to the CJEU ruling in the Arslan case in 
order to justify its rejection of the administrative authorities’ practice of detaining TCNs based 
solely on submission of multiple asylum applications. The Court inferred from Arslan and Mahdi 
that the fact of multiple asylum applications is not sufficient in itself to justify immigration 
detention. The Court underlines that there needs to be an individual assessment of the 
circumstances, and proof of an asylum application having been lodged solely to delay or jeopardise 
the enforcement of the RD. (I U 392/2015) The approach of the Slovenian Administrative Court is 
not equally shared throughout the European courts. In spite of the CJEU judgment, the distinction 
between detention in the context of asylum and detention in the context of pre-removal procedures 
is often blurred in practice (e.g. Hungary, Cyprus). 
(Estonia)
19
 – The Arslan judgment led to an extension of the judicial control powers of 
administrative courts when assessing the lawfulness of immigration detention in Estonia, following 
the judgment of the Supreme Court, which held that the administrative courts can rely on the 
circumstances of the application and other materials examined at the court hearing, in such cases. 
The Supreme Court held that administrative courts are not bound solely by the facts mentioned in 
a request to detain a person. The courts are competent to confirm detention on another legal basis 
than those indicated in the request. (The Circuit Court had a different opinion and found that courts 
cannot arbitrarily add to the reasons in the application for detaining a person.) 
Similarly to the AG Opinion in Arslan, the Supreme Court pointed out that it is difficult to 
distinguish whether the application for asylum is filed with the aim of delaying or frustrating the 
removal of a third-country national. The Court indicated several circumstances that should be assessed 
in order to establish whether the submission of the asylum application while the third-country national 
is under pre-removal detention is or is not an abuse of rights: 
● the circumstances of his/her arrival in the country; 
● circumstances of filing an application, also the time of filing an application; 
● earlier statements about his/her country of origin; 
● the actual credibility of his/her statements, which give grounds to the suspicion that the person may 
not be available in the case of the rejection of his/her application. 
                                                     
19 See the commentary of the Supreme Court of Estonia Judgment of 29 January 2015, registration no. 3-3-1-52-14 by R. 
Kitsing, in the ACTIONES database. 
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3. The right to an effective judicial protection in pre-removal detention cases 
C-146/14, PPU Mahdi, CJEU Judgment of 5 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320 
Extension of detention — Obligations of the administrative or judicial authority — Extent of judicial 
control by a court — Third-country national without identity documents — Obstacles to 
implementation of a removal decision — Refusal of relevant embassy to issue an identity document 
enabling the third-country national to be returned — Risk of absconding — Reasonable prospect of 
removal — Lack of cooperation — Whether the Member State concerned is under an obligation to 
issue a temporary document relating to the status of the person concerned. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
Factual and legal context: the preliminary reference request was preceded by internal 
jurisprudential debates in Bulgaria. They concerned the issue whether the judicial authority has the 
competence to renew the detention order as a first-instance decision-maker (see, for example, the 
Ruling of 12 July 2011 of the Supreme Administrative Court in case No. 8799/2011). Under the 
general legal system in Bulgaria the judicial authority acts as a decision-making body only when the 
procedure is not an adversarial one. However, the Law on Foreign Nationals in the Republic of 
Bulgaria, in its Article 46a, Para. 4, introduces an exception to the general system and stipulates that 
it is the court, which following the elapse of the initial six months of detention, shall decide whether 
to renew or discontinue it. The uncertainty regarding the power of national courts to ask for an 
adversarial proceedings in relation to the prolongation of pre-removal detention determined a 
Bulgarian court to address preliminary questions to the CJEU. 
Legal provision at issue: Article 15 RD 
Questions addressed by the national court: The referring court asked a series of procedure and 
substance questions concerning the interpretation of Article 15 RD. In short the referring court 
wished to know:  
● Whether the national administrative authority carrying out the periodic review of the legality of 
the detention has to issue a written decision each time they carry out this review; 
● The nature and scope of the mandatory review carried out by a court in respect of the extension of 
the detention measure, when the maximum detention period initially imposed has expired; 
● Whether Article 15(1) and (6) RD precludes a national practice whereby an initial period of six 
months’ detention may be extended solely on the grounds that the third-country national concerned 
has no identity documents and whether, where the facts are as in the main proceedings, there is a 
risk of absconding, as referred to in Article 15(1) and (6) of the directive; 
● Whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, for the purposes of determining whether the 
Bulgarian authorities may extend the detention of the third-country national, the latter has 
demonstrated “a lack of cooperation” and/or whether there were “delays in obtaining the necessary 
documentation from [the] third country”; 
● If the third-country national is released and the authorities of that State still do not issue an identity 
document, the Member State must issue a temporary document relating to the status of that person. 
Conclusion of the CJEU: The authorities which carry out the review of a third-country 
national’s detention at regular intervals pursuant to the first sentence of Article 15(3) RD are not 
obliged, at the time of each review, to adopt an express measure in writing that states the factual 
and legal reasons for that measure. Nevertheless, any decision adopted by a competent authority, 
on the expiry of the maximum period allowed for the initial detention of a TCN, concerning the 
prolongation of the detention must be in the form of a written measure that includes the reasons in 
fact and in law for that decision.  
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The Court also concluded that the “judicial authority which is deciding on the possibility of 
extending an initial period of detention must carry out an examination of the detention even if the 
authority which brought the matter before it has not expressly requested it to do so and even if the 
detention of the third-country national concerned has already been reviewed by the authority which 
made the initial detention order.” The judicial authority deciding upon an application for the 
extension of detention “must be able to rule on all relevant matters of fact and of law in order to 
determine, in the light of the requirements set out in paragraphs 58 to 61 of this judgment, whether 
an extension of detention is justified, which requires an in-depth examination of the matters of fact 
specific to each individual case. Where the detention that was initially ordered is no longer justified 
in the light of those requirements, the judicial authority having jurisdiction must be able to 
substitute its own decision for that of the administrative authority or, as the case may be, the judicial 
authority which ordered the initial detention and to take a decision on whether to order an 
alternative measure or the release of the third-country national concerned. To that end, the judicial 
authority ruling on an application for extension of detention must be able to take into account both 
the facts stated and the evidence adduced by the administrative authority and any observations that 
may be submitted by the third-country national. Furthermore, that authority must be able to consider 
any other element that is relevant for its decision should it so deem necessary. Accordingly, the 
powers of the judicial authority in the context of an examination can under no circumstances be 
confined just to the matters adduced by the administrative authority concerned.” (para. 62) 
The RD precludes that an initial six-month period of detention may be extended solely because the 
third-country national concerned has no identity document. 
Article 15(6)(a) RD must be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national who, in 
circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, has not obtained an identity document 
which would have made it possible for him to be removed from the Member State concerned may 
be regarded as having demonstrated a ‘lack of cooperation’ within the meaning of that provision 
only if an examination of his conduct during the period of detention shows that he has not 
cooperated in the implementation of the removal operation and that it is likely that that operation 
lasts longer than anticipated because of that conduct (causal relation between prolongation of 
removal and the TCN’s conduct), a matter which is to be determined by the referring court. 
The Court also concluded that the Member States do not have an obligation, but retain freedom to 
decide whether to regularise the stay of the TCN who cannot be removed (Art. 6(4) RD). 
AG: View of AG Szpunar 
CJEU Judgment: Third Chamber, Judgment of 5 June 2015 
Impact on the jurisprudence from the referring Member State: The main effect of the CJEU 
Judgment of 05 June 2014 in the Mahdi Case has been that the administrative authority began to 
issue decisions on extending the length of detention giving the factual and legal grounds, which are 
automatically submitted to the court for review. Thus detainees now are not in a disadvantaged 
position with regard to the right to effective remedies. As noted above, the second level judicial 
authority in Bulgaria has a limited scope of judicial review, that is, it establishes only the 
conformity of the judgment of the first level jurisdiction with the law and does not carry out fact-
finding work. 
As regards the CJEU conclusion that Article 15 (1) and (6) RD do not allow for national regulations 
like the Bulgarian one, according to which renewal of detention could be done solely on the ground 
that the TCN has no identity documents, the domestic jurisprudence is divergent. The Bulgarian 
Supreme Administrative Court gives preference to the CJEU conclusion, while other national courts 
follow a strict application of Article 44, Para. 6 of the Law on Foreign Nationals in the Republic of 
Bulgaria, which provides for the lack of identity documents of the TCN as a separate (autonomous) 
ground of detention.  
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The CJEU pronouncement that the sole fact of refusing to sign a declaration for voluntary return by 
the TCN does not amount to a ‘lack of cooperation’ within the meaning of Article 15 (6) of the 
Return Directive also has a similar divergent judicial implementation in Bulgaria.  
Last, but not least, in relation to the preliminary ruling that Member States must provide the third 
country national with written confirmation of his situation in cases when the TCN has no identity 
documents and has not obtained such documentation from his country of origin, the Bulgarian 
authorities started to provide TCNs, upon release from detention, with a written confirmation as to 
the grounds on which they have been released. (See more in the Bulgarian REDIAL Report on 
pre-removal detention) 
Impact on the jurisprudence from other Member States than the referring one: This 
preliminary ruling had also affected the Dutch judiciary in regard to the requirements of judicial 
motivation. The Dutch Council of State has changed its view on the deference of the court 
controlling the lawfulness of detention. Now, according to the Council of State, the question as to 
whether less coercive measures can be applied is to be judged in full by the court (Dutch Council of 
State, Decision No. 201408655/1/V3 – REDIAL Dutch Report on pre-removal detention). 
4. Use of specialised facilities as a general rule in detaining returnees 
C-473/13 and C-514/13, Bero & Bouzalmate, CJEU Judgment of 17 July 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2095 
Detention for the purpose of removal – Detention in prison accommodation – Not possible to provide 
accommodation for third-country nationals in a specialised detention facility – No such facility in the 
Land where the third-country national is detained. 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of 
Justice) and Landgericht München I (Regional Court Munich I, Germany). 
Factual context: In Germany, each Land (federated state) is responsible for carrying out the 
detention of illegally-staying third-country nationals. Since the Land of Hesse had no specialised 
detention facility that could accommodate women, Ms. BERO was detained almost one month in 
Frankfurt prison. Mr. Bouzalmate, for his part, was detained in a separate section of the prison of 
the city of Munich, due to the absence of specialised detention facilities in the Land of Bavaria.  
Legal provision at issue: Article 16 RD.  
Questions addressed by the national court: the German Courts requested the Court of Justice to 
determine whether a Member State is required to detain illegally-staying third-country nationals in a 
specialised detention facility when the federated state competent to decide upon and carry out such 
detention does not have such a detention facility.  
Conclusion: according to the wording of the Return Directive, detention for the purpose of removal 
of illegally-staying third-country nationals must, as a rule, take place in specialised detention 
facilities. It follows that the national authorities responsible for applying that requirement must be 
able to detain the third-country nationals in specialised detention facilities, regardless of the 
administrative or constitutional structure of the Member State under which those authorities fall. 
Thus, the fact that, in certain regions of a federal Member State, the competent authorities have 
provided for this kind of detention facility, while other regions failed to offer similar conditions, 
cannot amount to sufficient transposition of the Return Directive. 
While the Court acknowledges that a Member State which has a federal structure is not obliged to 
set up specialised detention facilities in each federated state, that Member State must nevertheless 
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ensure that the competent authorities of the regions of the federal State without such facilities can 
provide accommodation for third-country nationals in specialised detention facilities located in 
other regions.  
AG Opinion: AG BOT, 30 April 2014 
CJEU judgment: Grand Chamber, 17 July 2014 
Impact of the CJEU judgment: 
Impact of the national jurisprudence of the referring Member State: Implementing the decision of 
the CJEU, the Federal High Court decided that the detention of foreigners under the Return 
Directive must be executed in special detention facilities in accordance with Article 16(1) of the 
Return Directive (Bundesgerichtshof [Federal High Court]: BGH, judgment of 12 February 2015, V 
ZB 185/14; judgment of 29 October 2010, 5 ZB 233/10). This means that a particular building for 
the detention under the Return Directive within the compound of an ordinary prison cannot be 
considered as a special detention facility in the sense of the Return Directive (ibid.) judgment of 25 
July 2014, V ZB 137/14, para. 9). A detention order cannot be applied if the execution of a detention 
order in specialised detention facilities cannot be ensured due to the lack of sufficient facilities 
(judgment of 12 February 2015, V ZB 185/14). It should be noted that the case law resulted in the 
release of many detainees and that the regions went to considerable efforts to establish detention 
facilities complying with the Return Directive.
20
 
Impact on the national legislation of the referring Member State: Section 62a Residence Act 
enshrined the case law of the Federal High Court into positive law. In exceptional cases they may be 
detained together with regular prisoners, though they will have to be separated within the facility. 
5. Separation from ordinary prisoners 
C-474/13, Pham, CJEU Judgment of 17 July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2096 
Detention for the purpose of removal — Detention in prison accommodation — Possibility of 
detaining a third-country national with ordinary prisoners where he or she has given his or her 
consent 
National court requesting a preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, 
Germany). 
Factual context: Ms. Pham, a Vietnamese national, was detained in a prison in Bavaria. She 
consented to be detained together with ordinary prisoners.  
Legal provision at issue: Recital 17, Article 16 RD.  
Questions addressed by the national court: Is it consistent with Article 16(1) of the Directive to 
place a pre-deportation detainee in accommodation together with ordinary prisoners if the person 
consents to such accommodation? 
Conclusion: according to Article 16 RD, detention for the purpose of the removal of illegally-
staying third-country nationals must take place, as a rule, in specialised detention facilities. A 
Member State cannot take account of the wish of the third-country national concerned to be 
detained in prison accommodation. The Court observes that under the Return Directive the 
obligation requiring illegally-staying third-country nationals to be kept separated from ordinary 
prisoners is not coupled with any exception and thereby guarantees the observance of the foreign 
                                                     
20 Information provided by the German REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention. 
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nationals’ rights in relation to detention. More specifically, the separation requirement is more than 
just a specific procedural rule for carrying out the detention in prison accommodation and 
constitutes a substantive condition for that detention, without observance of which the latter would, 
in principle, not be consistent with the directive (paras. 21 and 22).  
AG Opinion: AG BOT, 30 April 2014 
CJEU judgment: Grand Chamber, 17 July 2014 
German Federal High Court: BGH, Judgment of 12 February 2015, V ZB 185/14 
After the CJEU ruling in the above joined cases, the German Federal High Court declared that 
detention of foreigners under the Return Directive must be carried out in special detention facilities 
in accordance with Article 16(1) of the Return Directive. This notably means that a particular 
building for the detention under the Return Directive within the compound of an ordinary prison 
cannot be considered as a special detention facility in the sense of the Directive. (BGH, judgment 
of 25 July 2014, V ZB 137/14, para. 9). In practice, a lack of sufficient “specialised” facilities is 
not likely to justify the use of prison accommodation. In such cases, the detention order cannot be 
applied and detainees must be immediately released. The Courts have followed this line in their 
subsequent jurisprudence and federated states undertook considerable efforts to establish detention 
facilities complying with the Return Directive. Upon the applicant’s request, national courts have to 
assess the proportionality of the measures considered. The Judge must reject the detention if it was 
foreseeable that the foreigner would be accommodated contrary to the requirements of EU law: e.g. 
when it was clear that pre-removal detention would be carried out in the Büren prison instead of a 
specialised premise, and thus would be in violation of Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC 
(German Federal Civil Court, Decision of 18 February 2016, V ZB 74/15).  
From a legal perspective, Section 62a Residence Act enshrined the case law of the Federal High 
Court into positive law. When exceptional circumstances require so, third-country nationals may be 
detained together with ordinary prisoners, as long as both categories are physically and “locally” 
separated.
21  
 
                                                     
21 See German REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention, pp. 18-19.  
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III. Main Outcomes of Judicial Dialogue on pre-removal detention (Article 15 RD): a 
comparative analysis 
1. Distinguishing immigration detention under the Return Directive from criminal 
imprisonment of irregular migrants – the impact of the CJEU jurisprudence 
Immigration detention has been a controversial issue in particular due to the difficulty of solving the 
legal paradox it creates. Notably, immigration detention under the Return Directive is an administrative 
measure which lacks the safeguards of criminal proceedings, though its effects on the right to liberty are 
similar. At the same time, qualifying immigration detention as a criminal measure has been considered to 
be a disproportionate sanction for an offence, consisting of only illegal entries or stays. As highlighted by 
several Advocate Generals of the CJEU, “detention for removal purposes is neither punitive nor penal 
and does not constitute a prison sentence.”22 It is thus important to distinguish between the various 
situations that can legitimise the criminalisation of irregular entry, stay or residence, given that in such 
situations, the norm is the application of the procedures set out by the RD. 
According to Article 2(2)(b) RD, Member States may decide not to apply the Return Directive to 
TCNs who are subject to a criminal law sanction or to extradition. For the derogation to be valid, the 
Member States have to provide for this expressly in the national implementing legislation. Should the 
Member State not publish these norms, clarifying in which instances it makes use of the derogation, 
then they cannot be used by the Member States against individuals.
23
 The Belgian Cour de 
Cassation
24
 considered that the Return Directive does not apply to a third-country national who is 
illegally staying on the territory, due to a conviction for a criminal offence. As a result, the criminal 
sanction applicable to the criminal offence would determine the applicable legal regime and ought to 
be applied in addition to the criminal sanction for irregular stay.
25
 Yet, Belgium has not expressly 
provided for norms transposing Article 2(2)(b) RD into national law. 
In practice, migration-related offences are quite often criminalised by Member State legislation, 
punishable either by a fine (Italy, Spain), a prison sentence (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and the 
Netherlands) or even immediate expulsion (Italy). Some issues have been referred to the CJEU in the 
context of preliminary rulings, and the Court has clarified the following standards:
26
 
 The RD precludes Member States from imposing imprisonment under national criminal law 
on the sole grounds of illegal stay ‘before or during carrying out return procedures’, since this 
would delay return. Furthermore, Member States must follow a mandatory order of measures 
in return proceedings, which should go from the least coercive – granting the individual a 
period for voluntary departure – to the most coercive – pre-removal detention. Where Member 
States have not followed this procedure, third-country nationals who are being detained must 
be released, as their detention is unlawful. (El Dridi
27
) 
                                                     
22 View of Advocate General Mazák in El Dridi (C-61/11 PPU, EU:C:2011:205, point 35), and View of Advocate General 
Wathelet in G. and R. (C-383/13 PPU, EU:C:2013:553, point 54); View of AG Szpunar, in Mahdi (Case C‑
146/14 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1936, point 47). 
23 See Return Handbook. 
24 See the judgment of 5 November 2014, no. P.14.1271.F/3.1. 
25 Article 75 of the Law on Aliens of 15 December 1980. 
26 For more details see Section I of this Electronic Journal. 
27 See para. 59. 
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 The RD precludes the imprisonment of an illegally-staying TCN who is not ready to leave 
voluntarily and who has not been subject to the coercive measures detailed in Article 8. 
(Achughbabian) 
 The RD does not preclude criminalising illegal stays by a fine but precludes criminalisation by 
home detention without guaranteeing that its enforcement must end as soon the physical 
transportation is possible. (Sagor) 
 The RD precludes legislation providing, in the event of TCNs staying illegally, for either a 
fine or removal, since the two measures are mutually exclusive. (Zaizoune) 
 The RD does not preclude a prison sentence on an illegally-staying TCN who, after having 
been returned, unlawfully re-enters a Member State in breach of an entry ban. (Celaj) 
The complexities of intertwined administrative pre-removal detention and criminal proceedings are 
illustrative in the case of Aarrassi, Ababsa and Dhifalli decided by the Tribunal of Crotone, Italy.
28
 
Here the Tribunal had to assess whether the detained third-country nationals should be prosecuted for 
the criminal offence of demolition of state property and resistance to police officers, due to their 
protests against unnecessary detentions orders and the conditions in the Crotone detention center 
pending removal. Relying heavily on the El Dridi judgment, the Tribunal deduced several obligations 
which it applied in casu: 1) the direct effect of Article 15 RD, which can be invoked by individuals in 
order to disapply national legislation or annul administrative measure; 2) the mandatory order of 
measures and stages in the RD, ranging from the least coercive to the most restrictive measure; 3) the 
public administration’s obligation to issue detention orders “in writing with reasons being given in fact 
and law”; 4) the obligation to consider less restrictive alternatives to detention; 5) the obligation to 
immediate release if the detention is unlawful. The procedural and substantive safeguards developed 
by the CJEU in the El Dridi judgment were the center point in the Tribunal reasoning deciding that the 
detained TCNs acted out of necessity and self-defense. Their acts were legitimate given the unlawful 
detention orders and the sub-ECHR standards of detention conditions. 
In spite of this jurisprudence, problematic national provisions, and divergent judicial practice 
persist at the national level. For instance, in Cyprus, if TCNs are convicted for the offence of being 
illegal immigrants under the catch-all list of Article 6 of Aliens Law,
29
 they are removed from the 
ambit of the RD and must serve their prison sentence together with ordinary prisoners. In theory, those 
provisions of the national law which transpose the RD take priority over other provisions they may be 
in conflict with, but, in practice, Cypriot courts do not dispute the validity and operation of Article 6 as 
being contrary to the RD. An example of this is a case of a TCN who was detained for the purpose of 
her deportation because she was HIV positive, under Article 6(1)(c) of the national immigration law 
which defines carriers of contagious diseases as ‘illegal immigrants’. Although in that case, the Court 
rejected criminal imprisonment, since it found that HIV did not fit the description of a contagious 
disease as found in Article 6 of the immigration law and ruled that discrimination on the grounds of 
HIV status was unlawful, unfortunately, it did not dispute the validity of the national provision 
declaring a person to be an illegal immigrant.
30
 
In conclusion, the CJEU case law on the criminalisation of irregular immigration has drastically 
reduced the Member States practices of criminalising illegal entry, stay and thus of evading the 
application of strict rules provided by the RD. The public administration’s arguments in favour of 
criminalisation, such as: matters of public order or national security (e.g. Italy) have been rejected by 
                                                     
28 Tribunal of Crotone, judgment of 12 December 2012. 
29 Such as those persons who have previously been deported, persons whose entry in the Republic is prohibited by virtue of 
any legislation in force and persons considered illegal immigrants by virtue of the provisions of the immigration law. See 
more in Cypriot REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention, p. 9. 
30 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Leonie Marlyse Yombia Ngassam v. Republic of Cyprus, No. 493/2010, 20 August 2010, available 
on: www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_4/2010/4-201008-493-10.htm&qstring=marlyse. 
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national courts relying heavily on CJEU case law. However, the aforementioned cases reported from 
Belgium and Cyprus reveal that national courts still have erred in understanding the scope of 
application of Article 2(2) (b) RD, and continue to accept the argument according to which a TCN 
subject to a return order, as a result of a criminal sanction, is not entitled to avail him or herself of the 
protection conferred by the Directive. However, for this derogation to be lawful, the strict rules 
developed by the CJEU as regards the criminalisation of immigration should be respected even if the 
Member States preserve competences over criminal matters. 
2. The risk of absconding  
The most commonly invoked reason for pre-removal detention is the risk of absconding. The risk 
of absconding is one of the two exhaustive grounds for pre-removal detention (Article 15(1) RD). 
However, the definition of this concept is provided in general and abstract terms in Article 3(7) RD, 
which defines it as the “existence of reasons in an individual case which are based on objective criteria 
defined by law to believe that a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures may 
abscond”. This definition is quite abstract and elusive and has led in practice to various problems, such 
as: replacing these grounds with similar concepts which were broader than the risk of absconding 
(Spain
31
 and Austria
32
); lack of domestic legal definition (e.g. Austria, Greece, Malta and the Czech 
Republic); definition given in administrative acts (Hungary and Belgium),
33
 which have raised issues 
related to the transparency of norms and arbitrary administrative practice; and a wide list of objective 
criteria defined by the national legislator (e.g. Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia), making pre-removal 
detention on the grounds of a risk of absconding the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, 
citing the risk of absconding has become part of an automated and standardised process by 
administrative authorities. The REDIAL national Reports often mentioned that there is no prior 
examination of the facts of each case before detention orders are issued. 
Therefore, national courts across the Member States were confronted with key questions related to: 
the nature of the legal act where the risk of absconding should be defined; and the content of the risk 
of absconding, in particular, the definition of objective criteria, its assessment in concrete cases and 
remedies against inadequate definition and/or application. 
2.1 “Defined by law” requirement – Divergent domestic implementation and vertical and horizontal 
dialogue in action 
According to Article 3(7) RD, there are two important elements which the definition of the risk of 
absconding should fulfil, that of including “objective criteria” that are “defined by law.” 
There is a wide diversity of types of instruments adopted by the Member States for the purpose of 
implementing the EU notion of ‘risk of absconding’ in return proceedings. This ranges from: absence 
of a domestic legal definition of the risk of absconding, for instance in Greece, Malta, and the Czech 
Republic; definition provided in administrative acts in Hungary and Belgium; legislation which refers 
to a broader notion in Spain (see the Spanish Immigration Act 4/2000 (Article 62), which refers to the 
risk of “non appearance”); similarly in Austria, the law does not directly refer to the risk of 
absconding, and objective criteria are additionally developed by jurisprudence; while other Member 
                                                     
31 Spanish Immigration Act 4/2000 (Article 62) does not refer to the risk of “absconding” either. Rather, it refers to the risk 
of “non appearance”: “non presentation due to lack of residence or of identification documents”. It is possible that this 
broader definition has helped make pre-removal detention a first rather than a last resort measure. See the Spanish 
REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention. 
32 Austrian law does not directly refer to the risk of absconding, but to the need to secure either the procedure or the intended 
measure (e.g. deportation). See the Austrian REDIAL country Report on pre-removal detention. 
33 In Belgium, these criteria are merely listed in the explanatory memorandum to the Law of 19 January 2012. In Hungary, 
the risk of absconding is defined in a government decree. See the respective REDIAL National Reports. 
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States adopted legislative acts/provisions transposing the EU Directive’s notion of ‘risk of 
absconding’. 
Germany used to be one of these countries, but this gap was remedied following a fruitful dialogue 
between the judiciary and the legislator. In spite of its reticence to refer to EU secondary law and 
relevant CJEU jurisprudence,
34
 the Federal Civil Court held that the legislature had failed to fulfil the 
requirements set out by the RD, namely to expressly provide for objective criteria in domestic 
legislation (Decision of 18 February 2016 – V ZB 23/15). Following this judgment, the legislature 
amended section 2(14) of the Residence Act,
35
 which now includes concrete objective criteria (see 
REDIAL German Report on pre-removal detention, p. 5). A similar judgment was decided by the 
Federal Civil Court in relation to the legislator’s failure to define expressly and by law the risk of 
absconding in the framework of Dublin-based detention measures. (Decision of 26/06/2014 – V ZB 
31/14 for Dublin cases) 
These judgments affected the reasoning of domestic courts in other jurisdictions. A regional court 
from the Czech Republic referred to these judgments of the German Federal Civil Court in its 
reasoning, finding the detention of an Iraqi male and his two children (both minors) waiting to be 
transferred under the Dublin III Regulation to be unlawful, and ordered their release due to the 
absence of a legislative definition of the risk of absconding. On appeal, the Czech Supreme 
Administrative Court, being of a different opinion than the lower court, decided to address a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU asking for clarification of the required legal nature of the act that 
should provide the definition of the risk of absconding (C-528/15, Al Chodor, ECLI:EU:C:2017:213). 
The CJEU confirmed the interpretation of the first instance court. It recalled that, although “the 
provisions of regulations generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its 
being necessary for the national authorities to adopt measures of application, some of those provisions 
may necessitate, for their implementation, the adoption of measures of application by the Member 
States.” (para. 27) This is also the case with Article 2(n) of Dublin III Regulation, which does not have 
immediate direct effect, but necessitates transposition into national legislation. The CJEU continue to 
assess whether the notion of ‘law’ referred to in Article 2(n) of Dublin III Regulation “must be 
understood as including settled case-law which confirms, as the case may be, a consistent 
administrative practice.” (para. 29) Textual interpretation of the various translations in national 
languages of Article 2(n) Dublin III Regulation does not clarify whether the term ‘law’ is used in its 
general sense, or a more restricted meaning of ‘legislation’. The Court recalled that “where the various 
language versions differ, the scope of the provision in question cannot be determined on the basis of 
an interpretation which is exclusively textual, but must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and 
general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 26 May 2016, Envirotec Denmark, 
C-550/14, EU:C:2016:354, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).” (para. 32)  
                                                     
34 The El Dridi judgment as grounds for the direct effect of Article 15 RD. 
35 German legislature amended section 2(14) Residence Act, which now includes the following objective criteria: 
 prior cases in which the person concerned had evaded public authorities in the context of immigration proceedings, 
though it was legally obliged to make him-/ herself available to the authorities; 
 The foreign national deceived the authorities about his identity, in particular by destroying identity or travel 
documents or by pretending to be someone else; 
 the foreign national refuses to participate in administrative proceedings to identify him/her despite a legal 
obligation to do so – provided that it is established that he/she wants to abstract deportation given the circumstances 
of the individual case; 
 the foreign national paid considerable amounts of money for human trafficking provided that the circumstances of 
the individual case indicate that he/she will abscond in order not to frustrate her financial ‘investment’; 
 whenever a person declared expressly that he/she will abscond; 
 he/she has undertaken a considerable degree of preparatory actions to frustrate deportation provided that these 
actions cannot be overcome by the police. 
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The meaning and requirements of the EU notion of ‘law’ were found by the CJEU in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on limitations to the right to liberty. Court underlined that since Article 
2(n) in conjunction with Article 28 of Dublin III Regulation introduce a limitation to the right to 
liberty of individuals, the notion of ‘law’ should be interpreted in line with both Article 6 Charter and 
Article 5 ECHR. The Court borrowed the legal requirements that a limitation to the right to liberty has 
to fulfill under the Charter, from the ECtHR jurisprudence. Thus, ”the detention of applicants, 
constituting a serious interference with those applicants’ right to liberty, is subject to compliance with 
strict safeguards, namely the presence of a legal basis, clarity, predictability, accessibility and 
protection against arbitrariness.” (para. 40) In line with the Advocate General Opinion, the CJEU 
held that “only a provision of general application could meet the requirements of clarity, predictability, 
accessibility and, in particular, protection against arbitrariness.” It concluded that: “settled case-law 
confirming a consistent administrative practice on the part of the Foreigners Police Section, such as in 
the main proceedings in the present case, cannot suffice.” The consequence being that detention on the 
basis of a risk of absconding, where the objective criteria are not set in a provision of general 
application, cannot be based on Article 28(2) of Dublin III Regulation. 
Although the Al Chodor case concerned the implementation of a regulation, parallels can be drawn 
with the implementation of the ‘risk of absconding’ under the Return Directive. Notably, the 
safeguards of clarity, predictability, accessibility and protection against arbitrariness have to be 
fulfilled by the domestic provision transposing the notion of the risk of absconding within the 
framework of pre-removal detention. The CJEU clarified that administrative practice, even if 
consistent (such as administrative acts) do not fulfill these requirements. Therefore Member States 
which adopt pre-removal detention in the absence of a legal provision of general application, are 
acting against EU law. 
2.2 ‘Objective criteria’ requirement: Variety of national lists providing for such criteria  
From the definition of the ‘risk of absconding’ provided by Article 3 (7) RD, we can infer that the 
concept of ‘objective criteria’ refers to the “existence of reasons in an individual case […] to believe 
that a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures may abscond.” It should be noted 
that Member States essentially retain the freedom to determine the precise list of objective criteria. 
In implementing this rule, the Member States have followed diverse approaches to the type and 
number of objective criteria. Some Member State legislation and administrative practices do not 
include objective criteria. They just refer to the risk of absconding (Cyprus); others foresee illegal 
entry or stay (e.g. Estonia, France, Romania, Slovenia, Spain); lack of residence permits (Slovakia); 
lack of passport or other equivalent identification documents (Bulgaria); and refusal of voluntary 
departure (Bulgaria, Italy, Sweden, France and Romania) as objective criteria. They can, most of the 
time, act as sole legal grounds for pre-removal detention, in spite of established CJEU case law which 
prohibits pre-removal detention based solely on these grounds (El Dridi; Sagor; Achughbabian; Celaj; 
Mahdi) (see REDIAL Research Report 2016/05 for the national lists of objective criteria). Other 
Member States have significantly expanded the scope of the risk of absconding, by including a long 
list encompassing all possible objective criteria: this includes the above mentioned circumstances, see 
for instance Italy, and the Netherlands. In this way they have transformed pre-removal detention from 
a last resort measure, which should be adopted only in exceptional situations, into the norm in return 
proceedings (e.g. Italy). All this contradicts Recital 6 RD, which excludes, for instance, illegal stays or 
even illegal entries, on their own, from the list of ‘objective criteria’ (“consideration should go beyond 
the mere fact of an illegal stay”). It also contradicts the jurisprudence of the CJEU which clearly 
describes pre-removal detention as a measure to be adopted only after all the other return related 
measures (voluntary departure, removal, alternative measures) have failed to achieve the objective of 
effective return (see El Dridi, paras. 37-40). 
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2.3 Examples of ‘objective criteria’  
This section will not provide an exhaustive list of circumstances that are set out at national level as 
‘objective criteria’, since a comparative assessment of the domestic implementation of the ‘objective 
criteria’ requirement can be found in the REDIAL Research Report 2016/05. The purpose of this 
section is, first, to raise awareness of problematic legislative provisions, administrative practices, and 
divergent judicial approaches to the application of the ‘objective criteria’ requirement; and second, to 
offer solutions to the interpretation and application of this abstract EU concept inspired from landmark 
national judgments. 
a. Illegal entry, stay or residence 
In spite of established CJEU case law whereby pre-removal detention cannot be adopted on the 
basis of mere illegal entry/stay,36 these circumstances are still used as objective criteria which justify 
adoption of immigration detention based on the grounds of ‘risk of absconding’ in certain Member 
States. Illegal stay or residence is provided as an ‘objective criterion’ in Croatia, France, Slovenia, and 
in the case of Estonia, France and Romania even illegal entry with subsequent failure to apply for a 
residence permit, is listed among “objective criteria”. In Spain, though irregular stay is not expressly 
provided as an objective criteria, in practice a high number of detention measures are adopted on the 
basis of this criterion.37 All this contradicts Recital 6 RD, which, by stating that “consideration should 
go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay”, excludes illegal stay and even illegal entry alone38 from 
the list of ‘objective criteria’.39 A positive reaction to the CJEU judgment comes from German courts, 
which do not consider mere illegal entry as an indication of a risk of absconding. However, they do 
consider the payment of large amounts of money to smugglers for the purpose of illegally entering the 
territory of Member States as a valid indication that the person concerned might abscond.40 The 
German Federal Court considers, in this respect, that 5,000 EUR paid to smugglers are sufficient 
grounds for believing that a TCN might abscond.41  
b. Lack of a residence permit 
The lack of a residence permit is provided as an objective criterion defining a risk of absconding 
in Slovakia. The negative effects of these deficient domestic provisions are, to a certain extent, 
remedied by the judiciary’s practice. The Slovakian courts seem not to rely solely on the lack of a 
residence permit but consider in addition other individual circumstances to justify that there is a risk of 
absconding.
42
 For instance, in one case the Supreme Court confirmed a detention decision and argued 
that the TCN concerned, who entered illegally, did not report himself to the police previously to being 
caught by a police patrol.
43
 Similarly, the Regional Court of Bratislava, when establishing whether 
there was a risk of absconding, not only invoked the lack of a residence permit and a reasonable 
possibility that the TCN would be subject to an entry ban for a period of more than three years. The 
Court also took into account the nature of criminal offences committed in the past; the fact that the 
TCN concerned left the asylum facility in violation of the law; and that he went to another country 
after having applied for asylum in Slovakia. CJEU case law played a salient role in the individual 
                                                     
36 El Dridi, ibid.; Sagor (C-430/11, ECLI:2012:277); Achughbabian (C-329/11, ECLI:2011:807); Celaj (C-290/14, 
ECLI:2015:640). 
37 In 2015, 3,075 detentions on grounds of irregularly staying. See REDIAL Report on Spain. 
38 See also the Return Handbook. 
39 See further: FRA Report, 2010, op. cit., p. 27.  
40 U. Drews, “Die aktuelle Rechtsprechung des BGH zur Sicherungshaft nach dem Aufenthaltsgesetz, NVwZ, 2013, p. 259. 
41 BGH, Beschl. V. 03.05.2012 – V ZB 244/11, BeckRS 2012, 14183. 
42 Skamla, Q43 of the CONTENTION Report. 
43 Skamla, Q43 with reference to Supreme Court judgement 1 SZa 3/2014. 
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assessment test and in the rejection of the administration practice of the formal application of the ‘lack 
of residence permit’ criterion.44 
c. Lack of identity documents 
A common objective criteria mentioned in several national legislations and used in administrative 
practice has been the lack of identity documents. This criterion has been used as grounds not only for 
initial detention, but also for the prolongation of pre-removal detention. In the Mahdi case, the CJEU 
firmly rejected the possibility of prolonging the pre-removal detention because of a lack of identity 
documents alone (para. 73). As regards the possibility of the lack of identity documents being taken 
into consideration as criterion indicating a risk of absconding, the CJEU emphasised that national 
courts are required to carry out an assessment of facts surrounding the TCNs. As has already been 
stated by the Court, “any assessment relating to the risk of the person concerned absconding must be 
based on an individual examination of that person’s case” (Sagor, para. 41). Furthermore, as stated in 
recital 6 in the preamble to Directive 2008/115, “decisions taken under the directive should be adopted 
on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria.” (Mahdi, para. 70). 
Other domestic courts have taken a firmer position rejecting reliance on the absence of established 
identity and documents as the sole grounds for both initial detention measures and for the prolongation 
of detention. The Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court has consistently held that this alone 
cannot be the basis for detention without also carrying out an individual assessment. (No. A-3219-
858/2015, judgment of 22 July 2015).
45
 
However, Bulgarian, Romanian and Spanish
46
 legislation still take this criterion as being 
indicative of a risk of absconding. Furthermore, most of the Administrative Court of Sofia’s 
judgments confirming detention orders had, as a legal reason, the fact that the identity of the foreigner 
was not established.
47
 Most worrying is the fact that, the new draft of a Bulgarian law, amending the 
present legislation, maintains these grounds. It does so by way of introducing an additional type of 
immigration detention lasting for up to 30 days, whose purpose is “to conduct the initial identification 
and establishment of identity and to assess the subsequent administrative measures that should be 
imposed or taken”.48 In addition, there is divergent domestic jurisprudence in Bulgaria on whether lack 
of identity documents can or not constitute an objective criteria for finding a risk of absconding.
49
 
d. Refusal of voluntary departure 
Refusal of voluntary departure is an objective criteria in Bulgaria, Italy, Sweden, France and 
Romania. However the judicial approaches in the these countries diverge. Italian,
50
 French
51
 and 
Romanian courts generally uphold refusal as a strong enough indication of a risk of absconding. The 
                                                     
44 Ibid., with reference to judgment 9 Sp 99/2013. 
45 As of 1 March 2015, (Art. 113 (5) of the Aliens’ Law introduced objective criteria for the definition of the risk of 
absconding, among which also: 1) The foreign national does not have a document confirming his identity and is not 
cooperating in establishing identity or nationality (refuses to provide information about himself/herself, submits 
misleading information, etc.). Therefore, a lack of identity documents is, in itself, not sufficient grounds indicating risk of 
absconding. 
46 Article 62 Immigration Act 4/2000, see REDIAL Report on Spain, p. 7. 
47 REDIAL Report on Bulgaria, p. 9.  
48 Ibid. 
49 As regards the inability of the TCN to present identity documents and its consequences: see, for example, the differing 
practice in this regard of the Sofia City Administrative Court, e.g., Ruling in case No. 12187/2013, and the Haskovo 
Administrative Court, e.g., Ruling in case No. 219/2013. 
50 See the Italian REDIAL country Report on pre-removal detention. 
51 Court of Appeal of Marseille considered the TCN’s refusal to return voluntarily to be a risk of absconding justifying a 
detention measure. (CAA Marseille, 1e juillet 2016, req. n°15MA04751) 
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Swedish Court of Appeal and the Administrative Court of Sofia, relying on the RD and its case law, 
only come to this conclusion, on the other hand, after a careful individual assessment. 
For instance, the Administrative Court of Sofia in the follow-up to the preliminary ruling of the 
CJEU in Mahdi refused to continue detaining a TCN on the basis of his refusal to voluntarily return to 
his country of origin, The Administrative Court of Sofia, therefore, declared the detention unlawful 
and replaced it with weekly reporting.
52
 The Swedish Supreme Migration Court did not consider 
refusal of voluntary departure (objective grounds in Swedish legislation) as indicating a risk of 
absconding sufficient enough to justify a detention order. The justification of the Court was that, on 
the basis of this logic, the detention order would no longer be a last resort measure, but it would be 
ordered in the majority of cases. The Swedish Supreme Migration Court stressed that a simple 
declaration of unwillingness to return voluntarily by an alien about to be removed would not suffice 
for a detention decision: 
“Analysing the risk of absconding in such a manner could result in placing the majority of refused 
asylum seekers in detention”.53 
e. Submission or withdrawal of an asylum application 
In Arslan, the CJEU clearly said that “a third country national who is, at the time of the making of 
his asylum application, the subject of a return decision and is being detained on the basis of Article 15 
RD does not allow it to be presumed, without an assessment on a case-by-case basis of all the relevant 
circumstances, that he has made that application solely to delay or jeopardise the enforcement of the 
return decision and that it is objectively necessary and proportionate to maintain detention.” (para. 62). 
In spite of this preliminary ruling, the national legilation of several Member States still preserves the 
submission or withdrawal of an asylum application as an objective criterion sufficient to assume the 
risk of absconding (e.g. Romania, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Finland). In certain of these jurisdictions, 
the courts have remedied the effects of these national provisions by endorsing the individual 
assessment test required by the CJEU. In Slovakia and Finland, the introduction of an asylum 
application during pre-removal detention is not sufficient for holding a risk of absconding. There has 
to be also the intention of hampering the removal process, which indicates a risk of absconding, which 
in turn justifies a detention order. 
On the other hand, the fact that a TCN’s asylum application is still pending, which renders the 
prospect of removal impossible, is not, generally, seen by the Cypriot courts as justifying the TCN’s 
release from immigration detention.
54
 
In Hazaka, a Syrian asylum applicant filed for habeas corpus and asked to be released since there 
is no realistic prospect for his removal, given the ongoing war in Syria. Relying on Arslan,
55
 the 
applicant argued that he ought to be released from detention because there is no presumption that he 
filed an asylum application for the sole reason of delaying or averting his return to his country of 
origin. The Court rejected the aplication for habeas corpus on the ground that the applicant is not 
covered by the Return Directive since his detention and deportation resulted from his criminal 
conviction which led to his classification as a ‘prohibited immigrant’.56 The Cypriot REDIAL Report 
mentioned that asylum seekers are routinely detained for the purpose of removal immediately upon 
                                                     
52 See CONTENTION Report on Bulgaria, Ilareva, Q32 with reference to the judgment from 6 June 2014 in case no. 
1535/2014. 
53 Supreme Migration Court (Sweden), case no MIG 2008:23 UM1610-08. 
54 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Appeal jurisdiction, Habibi Pour Ali Faysel v. Republic of Cyprus through the Chief of Police and 
the Minister of the Interior, Civil appeal No. 236/15, 31 March 2016.  
55 CJEU,C-543/11, dated 30 May 2013. 
56 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Writs jurisdiction, Re the application of Antoan Hazaka, asylum seeker from Syria and now at the 
police detention centre in Menoyia over a habeas corpus writ, Case No. 110/2013, 19 July 2013. 
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rejection of their asylum claim and very often even before rejection. Furthermore, it was argued that 
the new asylum law adopted in 2016 grants the authorities wider powers of detaining asylum seekers 
prior to the determination of their asylum claim, essentially to address the risk of absconding and in 
circumstances which are similar to those of TCNs in an irregular situation. This has the potential of 
further blurring the distinction between asylum and immigration detention. 
f. Criminal record 
A criminal record or the suspicion of having committed a crime is still provided by legislation as 
grounds indicating a risk of absconding. This can of itself justify detention, and courts continue to 
confirm detention based on these grounds in Belgium, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia. On the other 
hand, in Germany a criminal record alone is not in itself sufficient grounds for the necessity of 
detention: other individual circumstances have to be taken into account.
57
 
In the case of Farak Nessim, the national court, citing a UK Court decision,
58
 concluded that the 
risk of absconding may be deduced by a person’s refusal to cooperate, but not necessarily and that the 
tendency to commit serious crime is also relevant.
59
 This judgment is important, too, because it 
attempted to establish objective criteria on the basis of which the risk of absconding can be identified. 
In Cyprus the implementing legislation does not provide for a list of objective criteria. The TCN’s 
tendency to commit a crime was referred as a criterion for determining whether there is a real risk of 
absconding.
60
 
2.4 The individual judicial assessment requirement 
Article 3(7) RD read in conjunction with recital 6, require that “decisions taken under this 
Directive should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria”. This implies that 
even when such “objective criteria” are set in national legislation, the general presumption of the 
existence of the risk of absconding is not sufficient and individual situations and individual 
circumstances must additionally be taken into consideration.
61
 Not all of the Member States 
legislation include the obligation for an individual assessment. On the contrary certain legislation 
requires the competent authorities to establish a risk of absconding when at least one of the 
circumstances provided by the legislation exists in practice. This is, for instance, the case in Italy, and 
it also used to be the case in France. However following actions by the European Commission, French 
legislation was amended in November 2016, and Law 274/7.03.2016 leaves a certain margin of 
discretion in establishing the risk of absconding, by providing that a risk of absconding could be 
established if one of the listed circumstances is found to exist.
62
 
Relying on the RD and the relevant CJEU jurisprudence, national courts from several Member 
States have reversed the practice of their administrative authorities, and re-interpreted flawed national 
legislation in line with the EU law. For instance, the Regional Court of Bratislava when establishing 
whether there was a risk of absconding, did not limit itself to an automatic consideration of criteria, 
                                                     
57 U. Drews, Die aktuelle Rechtsprechung des BGH zur Sicherungshaft nach dem Aufenthaltsgesetz, NVwZ 2012, p. 396, 
referring to the decision of the German Federal Court from 14 July 2011 – V ZB 50/11, BeckRS 2011, 21191. 
58 Walumba Lumba and Kadian Mighty v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC12. 
59 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re the application of Malak Shawki Farak Nessim, Civil application No. 66/2016, 24 August 
2016, available on: http://cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2016/1-201608-66-
16.htm&qstring=%EA%F1%E1%F4%E7%F3%2A%20and%202016. 
60 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re the application of Malak Shawki Farak Nessim, Civil application No. 66/2016, 24 August 
2016, available on: http://cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2016/1-201608-66-
16.htm&qstring=%EA%F1%E1%F4%E7%F3%2A%20and%202016. 
61 Case C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi, ECR I-3015, 2011, para. 39. Mahdi, para. 70. 
62 See, REDIAL Research Report 2016/05, p. 12, and French REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention. 
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such as a lack of a residence permit and a reasonable possibility that the TCN would be subject to an 
entry ban for a period of more than three years. The court also took into account the nature of criminal 
offences committed in the past; the fact that the TCN concerned left the asylum facility in violation of 
the law; and that he went to another country after having applied for asylum in Slovakia (with 
reference to judgment 9 Sp 99/2013, see also REDIAL Slovakian Report on pre-removal detention). 
Other domestic courts have taken a firmer position rejecting reliance on the absence of established 
identity and documents.  
The Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court has consistently held that this alone cannot be 
the basis for detention without carrying out an individual assessment. (No. A-3219-858/2015, 
judgment of 22 July 2015)  
The CJEU judgment in the El Dridi case led to an important change in the jurisprudence of the 
Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) which emphasised the importance of the principle of 
individual assessment. When referring to the previous legislation in force, that had been declared 
contrary to the RD by the CJEU, the Court clarified that the risk of absconding cannot be assessed 
only on the grounds that the foreigner failed to comply with an order of expulsion placed under the 
previous legal regime, which was considered contrary to the Directive. Such an assessment would not 
be valid, failing an individual evaluation of the TCN’s personal situation, in light of all the criteria 
currently set forth by the law (see Supreme Court no. 437 of 10 January 2014). 
German courts generally require concrete facts. In particular, the German courts request from the 
administration proof of statements or behaviour on the part of the TCN which point, with a certain 
likelihood, to an attempt to abscond or hamper the deportation in a way which cannot be simply 
overcome by the application of ordinary enforcement measures, which do not require a deprivation of 
liberty. A multiple change of domicile which has not been communicated to the alien authorities in 
spite of repeated warnings and the TCN subsequently going into hiding, as well as a flight attempt at 
the occasion of a police arrest may be taken as a factor justifying a risk of absconding. The mere fact 
of an illegal stay or entry does not justify, though, the court in deciding that there is a risk of 
absconding. 
As regards the use of individual assessment by the judiciary, reference should be made to a ground-
breaking judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court from August 2011, which triggered an 
important jurisprudential change in Bulgaria (Case No. 13868/2010). The Court concluded that 
Recitals 6 and 13 of the Preamble to the RD require the authorities to take into account several factors 
when establishing a risk of absconding. Among these, the Court mentioned: the duration of the 
TCN’s residence in the Republic of Bulgaria; the categories of vulnerable persons; the existence of 
proceedings under the Law on Asylum and Refugees or proceedings for the renewal of a residence 
permit or of another authorisation offering a right to stay; the family situation; and the existence of 
the TCN’s family, cultural and social ties with his/her country of origin. This individual assessment 
approach was confirmed in a judgment of the Sofia City Administrative Court, delivered after the 
CJEU preliminary ruling in case of Mahdi (Case No. 1535). When assessing whether there was still a 
risk of absconding, the Court refused to confirm pre-removal detention solely based on the lack of 
identity documents of the third-country national and took into account the fact that a Bulgarian citizen 
provided accommodation and means of subsistence to the TCN concerned (see CONTENTION Report 
on Bulgaria). 
2.5 Judicial assessment of collective expulsion and pre-removal detention 
The EU Charter and the ECHR and its case law have recently been used by the lawyers of detained 
third-country nationals in order to claim for immediate release following the administration practice of 
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collective expulsions. In the case of Falak Shad,
63
 the applicant argued that there was a violation of 
Article 19(1) of the EU Charter and of Article 4(1) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR, both of which 
prohibit mass deportations, as the authorities deported all persons involved in the incident in which the 
applicant was also involved and which formed the basis for his detention and deportation. The 
applicant claimed that the authorities ordered the deportation of all persons involved, without 
examining each case separately. To this end, the applicant’s lawyer also cited the definition of 
collective expulsions given by the ECHR in Becker v. Denmark (Appl. 7011/75). Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus rejected the argument of collective expulsions, concluding that 
simultaneous deportation of several persons does not necessarily mean a collective expulsion; nor, 
continued the court, was there any evidence that each case was not examined separately. The court did 
not, however, carefully assessing whether the administration carried out a proper individual and case-
by-case assessment providing, in writing, the necessary facts for their decisions. 
3. Other legal grounds for pre-removal detention 
The Kadzoev judgment has had a salient impact on domestic judiciaries as regards the grounds for 
pre-removal detention. First of all it has been used by national courts to strike as unlawful, pre-
removal detention based on small crimes or public-order offences. For instance, petty thefts, 
commonly used as a basis for immigration detention in the Netherlands, before the Return Directive 
became applicable, are no longer accepted as legitimate grounds for detention.
64
 These can be put 
forward as a justification for detention only if these grounds can justify the conclusion that someone 
avoids or hampers removal or if a risk of absconding exists given the individual circumstances. 
The CJEU’s restrictive interpretation of the grounds for pre-removal detention has also affected the 
jurisprudence of the Belgian Court of Cassation.
65
 This court has taken a clear stance, holding that 
Article 15(1) RD requires a narrow interpretation of the objective criteria and that the two grounds 
(risk of absconding and avoiding/hampering removal) for immigration detention are exhaustive. 
Unfortunately, first instance Belgian courts are not uniformily following the approach of the supreme 
court.
66
 
When issues of security are at stake, even Supreme courts seem to disregard the CJEU ruling in 
Kadzoev. In the case of Falak Shad the Cypriot Supreme Court found that the administration’s 
discretion as regards issues of the entry, stay and work of third-country nationals is wide and there is 
no duty to justify its actions when issues of security are invoked. The Court concluded that the 
administration is not obliged to give reasons for the deportation or refusal of entry of any person and 
the Court will not look into reasons of state security, as this is purely a matter for the executive and not 
the judiciary.
67
  
                                                     
63 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Falak Shad v. the Republic, Case No. 763 /2011, 26 July 2013, available on http://cylaw.org/cgi-
bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_4/2013/4-201307-763-11.htm&qstring=Falak%20and%20Shad. 
64 Council of State, 21 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP9284. 
65 Decision No. P.14.0005.N/1, 21 January 2014. 
66 Brussels (Indict. Chamber), judgment of 13 May 2015; Brussels (Indict. Chamber), judgment of 12 June 2015. 
67 Supreme Court, Falak Shad v. the Republic, Case No. 763 /2011, 26 July 2013, available on http://cylaw.org/cgi-
bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_4/2013/4-201307-763-11.htm&qstring=Falak%20and%20Shad. 
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4. Judicial control of pre-removal detention  
4.1 Mapping out the problems resulting from varied configurations of judicial competences, scope and 
intensity of judicial scrutiny 
According to Article 15(2) RD, detention can be ordered by either an administrative or a judicial 
authority. In most of the Member States, judicial authorities are not involved at the initial stage of 
ordering the detention measure, as this usually falls under the competences of the police, prosecutor, 
prefect or other civil servants of the national Ministries of Interior: an important exception is Germany 
where detention measures are ordered by the judicial authority (the civil court). 
Should detention be ordered by order an administrative authority, the Member States are required 
to subject the detention order to either a speedy automatic judicial review or to grant the third-country 
national the right to ask for a speedy judicial review (Article 15(2) RD). However, not all the Member 
States have secured judicial scrutiny of pre-removal detention: for example, Hungary where the initial 
detention order is not subject to judicial control, but only the extension is. And even when the Member 
States provide for judicial scrutiny, there is a varied configuration of judicial competences among the 
Member States: 
 Criminal judge, in Belgium, Spain and recently also in France, Poland (criminal chambers in 
common courts are competent only in cases of apprehension); 
 Civil judge in Germany; 
 Specialised administrative courts: specialised chambers on immigration law (e.g. the 
Netherlands, Austria, Bulgaria only within the Supreme Administrative Court) or specialised 
administrative courts (Sweden); 
 General administrative courts competent to judge all matters falling under administrative law; 
(this is the case in most Member States); 
 General courts competent to judge all matters (civil, criminal, etc.) (Hungary); 
 “Justice of the Peace” in Italy (a non-professional judge).68 
The nature of the competence affects the scope and intensity of judicial control of pre-removal 
detention measures. The widest powers of control are perhaps held by civil and criminal judges/courts 
who order pre-removal detention, unlike administrative courts who only control the detention order 
taken by the administration. Civil and criminal courts can decide on all aspects of the pre-removal 
detention cases, including: weighing the principle of proportionality; establishing alternative 
measures; and replacing the decision of the administration with that of their own. On the other hand, 
administrative judges cannot decide the adoption of pre-removal detention, they only control the 
detention order proposed by the administration. They also have more limited powers of control, for 
instance, they can usually assess only manifest errors committed by the administrative authorities, they 
can annul their decisions, if such errors are found, but cannot substitute the decision of the 
administration with that of their own. 
In addition to the problems resulting from the different allocation of judicial review of pre-removal 
detention among the Member States, problems arise also from the division of judicial control of return 
related measures within the same Member State. For instance, though civil and criminal courts have 
more extensive powers of judicial control of pre-removal detention, they cannot assess the lawfulness of 
the return/removal order, as these measures fall under the competences of administrative courts. An 
                                                     
68 The fact that this is not a professional judge raises issues, especially in relation to the constitutional guarantees of 
independence of the judiciary. This system has been criticized by the UN special rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants because it lacks any real control over detention orders. 
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unusual judicial configuration exists in Belgium, where criminal courts can assess the legality of the 
removal orders, but they cannot annul them, as this falls under the competences of the administrative 
court (Aliens Litigation Court). Unlike criminal courts in other countries, they do not make decisions on 
the adoption of the detention order, but only control it, since the detention order is interpreted in Belgium 
as an accessory to the removal order, which falls under the competences of the Aliens Litigation Court. 
In Cyprus
69
 the division of tasks between courts is furthermore complicated since the judicial control is 
divided on the basis of whether the lawfulness or the length of pre-removal detention is requested, and 
not depending on the stage in return proceedings, as is the case for instance in other domestic 
jurisdictions.
70
 Divergent jurisprudence also occurs in practice due to the fact that the risk of absconding 
might be interpreted differently by the various national courts involved in the different stages of the 
return proceedings. Another consequence is that the third-country national has often already been 
removed by the time the judge in charge of detention examines the legality of that detention. 
The problems resulting from the varied allocation of judicial competences among the Member 
States and within the same Member States are amplified by the formal judicial review of pre-removal 
detention which is still pursued by national courts. Several of the REDIAL national Reports argued 
that many national courts carry out a formal judicial review, lack meaningful reviews of the substantial 
merits of the administrative decisions on immigration detention: e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Spain. 
The diverse scope and intensity of domestic judicial scrutiny existing among the Member States, 
but also within the same Member State adds inconsistency to the varied national regimes 
implementing the confusing EU concept of ‘risk of absconding’. The consequence is a fragmented 
European framework on pre-removal detention, with different standards of fundamental rights 
protection. In this context, a certain uniform interpretation and implementation of the risk of 
absconding, and respect of fundamental rights have been infused by national courts influenced in their 
decisions by CJEU, ECtHR or other foreign domestic courts. In the following paragraphs we comment 
upon a few national landmark cases achieving this outcome (for a full analysis, see the REDIAL 
Research Report 2016/05). 
4.2 A developing trend of more unified and intensive judicial review – the contribution of national 
courts and judicial interactions 
In spite of counter-productive divisions of judicial competences among national courts and 
limitations on the domestic judicial review of pre-removal detention, a trend of unification of judicial 
competences and extending judicial scrutiny powers over return related decisions is developing. For 
instance, more and more national courts start to: assess all aspects of facts and law in cases of pre-
removal detention both in first orders or for prolongation of detention; carry out a careful assessment 
of the proportionality of the administrative detention measure; establish alternative measures for 
themselves; assess the lawfulness of both pre-removal detention and other connected return-related 
measures. These outcomes have been achieved under the impact of the principle of the primacy of EU 
law, in casu the RD, EU Charter and ECHR, and sometimes also due to the use of judicial interaction 
techniques, such as: the preliminary reference, the disapplication of national law, consistent 
interpretation, and referral to foreign domestic judgments. 
                                                     
69 For instance, the judge who examines the legality of detention does not have the power to also examine the return measure 
beyond acknowledging its existence, even if the judge in charge of return is part of the same Court as is the case in 
Austria. A negative consequence of this separation of judicial competences is the fact that a TCN might be detained 
though the return decision is unlawful. 
70 Up until 2015, when the administrative court was set up, applications for judicial review, for habeas corpus and the 
appeals to these decisions were tried by the same court (the Supreme Court) in its different jurisdictional capacities. 
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Extending the review powers of national courts 
As previously highlighted, in most EU countries, the judicial review of pre-removal detention was 
allocated to administrative courts, which have traditionally more limited powers of review than civil 
and criminal courts. This picture has considerably evolved due to the reinforcement of the judicial 
review function of the national courts, which can be explained by the influences of European law 
(Return Directive), and especially by the right to effective judicial review (Article 47 EU Charter) and 
effective legal protection (Articles 6 and 13 ECHR) as interpreted by the CJEU and ECtHR.  
One of the landmark cases leading to the extension of review powers of national courts in pre-
removal detention is the Mahdi case. According to AG Szpunar in Mahdi, “the judicial authority must 
be in a position to determine whether the grounds forming the basis of the detention decision are still 
valid and, as the case may be, whether the conditions for extending detention are fulfilled. In order to 
comply with Article 47 of the Charter, the national court must have unlimited jurisdiction with regard 
to the decision on the merits.” Consequently the national courts must be able to decide on: 
 an extension of detention; 
 on replacement of detention by a less coercive measure or 
 on the release of the person concerned. 
Additionally, “the judicial authority must have power, if necessary, to require the administrative 
authority to provide it with all the material concerning each individual case and to require the third-
country national concerned to submit his observations. […] Consequently it is for the national court 
to assume unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the substance of the case. Thus, as it may apply 
Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 directly it must, if necessary, disregard the provisions of national law 
which have the effect of preventing the assumption of unlimited jurisdiction.”71 
As a consequence, the administrative judge has taken on a new role in the institutional framework 
and is better equipped to intervene effectively in administrative decision-making, balancing various 
interests (public interest of effective expulsion and the protection of the rights of individuals). 
Several forms of extension of judicial review powers can be identified in the national courts: 
 Wider power of domestic judges to control the content of the administrative act following a 
legislative transfer of competences from the administrative to the criminal judge (France) or 
by the ex officio extension of power by administrative courts in the absence of legislative 
empowerment (Bulgaria, Slovenia); 
 Increased judicial scrutiny of due diligence obligations of the administration (the Czech 
Republic);
72
 
                                                     
71 Judgments in Simmenthal (C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 21) and Solred (C-347/96, EU:C:1998:87, paragraph 29). 
See also AG Szpunar in Mahdi (ibid.), points 73-79. 
72 German Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the detention request made by the authorities before a court must 
comprise explanations on the following aspects: 
 the obligation to leave the country; 
 the conditions for removal or forcible return;  
 the necessity of the detention; 
 the feasibility of deportation and for the necessary period of detention;  
 the prescribed reasoning of the detention request must be related to the specific case – empty formulas and text 
modules are not enough; 
 with regard to the feasibility of the intended deportation, explanations are necessary with regard to the country in 
which the person concerned shall be deported. It is necessary to specify whether and in what timeframe returns in 
the country in question are usually possible. Concrete information is needed on the conduct of the process and an 
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 Replacing formal judicial control with a meaningful and in-depth judicial review of the 
evidence and substantial merits provided by the administration in their decisions on pre-
removal detention (instances in Lithuania, Romania,
73
 Cyprus and the Czech Republic, 
which have not reached, though, the level of generalised domestic practices). This practice has 
occurred under the impact of the RD requirement of individual assessment. 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 5(4) ECHR standards in immigration detention (A.M. 
and others v. France) has recently played a salient role in having the French legislature confer 
extended judicial review powers to the Juge des libertés et de la détention. In this case, the Strasbourg 
Court identified problems with the limited judicial control of the pre-removal detention of children in 
the French jurisdiction, which determined that the French legislature should amend the legislation in 
force before the summer of 2016 and should recognise the wider powers of judicial review over the 
legality of pre-removal detention on the part of French criminal judges: for more details on their 
concrete powers, see the REDIAL French Report on pre-removal detention. The ECtHR standards of 
prohibition of arbitrariness in cases of deprivation of liberty have been invoked by the Czech 
Supreme Administrative Court, explicitly rejecting the deferential review exercised by the 
Municipal Court in Prague, which held that it is up to the police to decide how to proceed with 
removal arrangements. Following this 2011 judgment, the Czech administrative courts were no longer 
satisfied with the basic information that the police made some progress in removal arrangements. 
Instead, they require the police to show concrete steps taken in order to remove a TCN. Moreover, 
these steps must be included in the case file; otherwise they cannot be used as evidence before the 
courts (REDIAL Czech Report on pre-removal detention, p. 17.) 
Under the impact of the RD provisions and the judgment of their superior court (Conseil d’Etat), 
French courts have departed from a limited understanding of their powers. Before they dealt only with 
manifest errors committed by the administration or automatically endorsed the reasoning of the 
administration. They have now expanded their control to “errors of appreciation” committed by the 
administration (CAA Nancy, 18.02.2013). 
The preliminary ruling delivered by the CJEU in the Mahdi case has also played a salient role in 
reshaping domestic procedural norms on the allocation of powers between the administrative 
authorities and national courts in the referring jurisdiction, but also in other domestic jurisdictions. 
One should keep in mind that the CJEU held in Mahdi that the judicial authority has the power to take 
into account the facts stated and evidence adduced by the administrative authority which has brought 
the matter before it. This includes any facts, evidence and observations which may be submitted to the 
judicial authority in the course of proceedings. But it can also consider ex officio also other 
circumstances within the ambit of the individual assessment which national courts have the power to 
exercise. 
On the basis of the Mahdi preliminary ruling, the Bulgarian judiciary disapplied the domestic law 
(Law on Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 46a, para. 4) which says that judicial 
renewal of detention following the lapse of the first six months takes place in a closed hearing without 
the participation of the TCN. With few exceptions, the practice of convening an open hearing with the 
participation of the detained TCN has become stable case law in Bulgaria. This follows the two 
precedent-setting judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court in the cases Kapinga (Decision of 
27 May 2010, in case No. 2724/2010) and Tsiganov (Decision of 8 February 2011 in case No. 
14883/2010). In those cases the Supreme Administrative Court invoked inter alia Article 47 EU 
Charter (the right to a public hearing in particular), together with Article 15 RD, Article 5(4) and 
Article 13 ECHR (REDIAL Bulgarian Report on pre-removal detention). 
(Contd.)                                                                  
illustration as to which period is normally needed to execute the individual steps of removal under normal 
conditions. 
73 Court of Appeal of Bucharest, case no. 3312 / 04.12.2014. 
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Under the impact of the RD and its case law, the Cypriot courts have extended their judicial 
review powers beyond the limits set out by the Constitution. The relevant constitutional provision 
provides that the Court in the judicial review process is empowered to examine whether a particular 
administrative act is contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law or is made in 
excess or in abuse of the powers vested in the administrative authority. However, given that judicial 
review was the process designated by the law for controlling the lawfulness of detention under the RD, 
the courts have, in the majority of cases, gone further than merely examining the decision making 
process to check whether the facts of the case justified the decision taken. Another salient example of 
the extension of judicial control is given by the Cypriot Supreme Court in the case of the habeas 
corpus application of Vilma Galivan Marcelino.
74
 The Court rejected the argument of the authorities 
about the lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the case concerned the legality of detention (for 
which the judicial review procedure should be used) and not the duration of the detention (for which 
the habeas corpus procedure was used). The Court ruled that ‘it is obvious that the two ways of 
reviewing the legality of detention, in private and public law, converge to a degree in the framework 
of the scope of application of the [Return] Directive, aiming in a unified manner, to the control of the 
legality of detention’.75 The Supreme Court thus offered a ground-breaking example of bolstering 
judicial control for the purpose of unifying domestic judicial review in immigration detention cases. 
5. Reasonable Prospect of Removal 
The case law of the ECtHR
76
 and the CJEU,
77
 recognising the Reasonable Prospect of Removal 
(RPR) as a mandatory legality criterion that competent authorities should assess in all cases of pre-
removal detention, has had a positive impact on the jurisprudence of several national courts (e.g. the 
Czech and Bulgarian courts). The application of the RPR as a requirement within the legality 
assessment of pre-removal detention should be furthermore appreciated in these Member States due to 
the fact that there is no express domestic legislation providing the RPR as a criterion for the legality 
check of detention measures. The Czech Supreme Administrative Court required the competent 
authorities, when deciding on the detention of a TCN, to consider whether the enforcement of 
administrative expulsion is at least possible.
78
 The Sofia City Administrative Court applied the RPR 
legality criterion not only in the initial pre-removal detention order, as the domestic legislation so 
requires,
79
 but also when reviewing the legality of the prolongation of detention.
80
 
                                                     
74 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re. the application of Vilma Galivan Marcelino, Civil application no. 169/2012, 14 December 
2012, available on: www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2012/1-201212-169-
12.htm&qstring=%E1%F0%E5%EB%E1%F3%2A. 
75 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re. the application of Vilma Galivan Marcelino, Civil application no. 169/2012, 14 December 
2012, available on: www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2012/1-201212-169-
12.htm&qstring=%E1%F0%E5%EB%E1%F3%2A. Under the new regime the option of the unified approach is lost 
because the administrative court is not at liberty to examine habeas corpus applications and the supreme court is no 
longer competent to examine applications for judicial review. 
76 Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 58149/08, 12 February 2013, § 77, also referring to Ali v. Switzerland, Appl. 
No. 24881/94, Commission’s report of 26 February 1997 (unpublished), § 41, and A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
op.cit., § 167. Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR has declared that “if the authorities are – as they surely must have 
been in the present case – aware of those difficulties, they should consider whether removal is a realistic prospect, and 
accordingly whether detention with a view to removal is from the outset, or continues to be, justified.” 
77 In Kadzoev, the AG held that: “as is clear from the wording of Article 15(4) of the Return Directive, the existence of an 
abstract or theoretical possibility of removal, without any clear information on its timetabling or probability, cannot 
suffice in that regard. There must be a ‘reasonable’, in other words realistic, prospect of being able to carry out the 
removal of the person detained within a reasonable period.” See also Case C-357 PPU, Kadzoev, op. cit., para. 65. 
78 No. 1 As 12/2009-61 of 15 April 2009, see REDIAL Czech Report on pre-removal detention 
79 See Art. 44(8) of the Law on Foreign Nationals; for details see REDIAL Bulgarian Report on pre-removal detention. 
80 Case No. 11595/2012. 
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The positive impact of the ECtHR and Return Directive on this domestic jurisprudence is limited 
though due to the divergence between the domestic courts from these two Member States (Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic). The approach of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court was not 
equally shared by all lower administrative courts. While the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative 
Court did not share the approach of the Sofia Administrative Court. 
German courts seem to follow a close application of these CJEU rules, carrying out a strict 
assessment of the Aliens Authorities arguments regarding the existence of a prospect of removal.
81
 
The Courts of appeal in Germany have frequently challenged a general assumption of a prospect of 
removal made by the Aliens Authorities if the Authorities have not provided specific facts on the 
different steps to be taken in order to carry out a deportation order and the potential barriers to a 
removal.
82
 Similarly, the German Federal Court of Justice requires that the judicial decisions 
ordering or renewing detention must be corroborated with specific information about the course of 
procedures and the time-frame within which particular measures can be taken under normal 
circumstances.
83
 
Following the relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR a positive legislative change 
came in Italy. The Italian Aliens Law was amended at the end of 2014,
84
 including the RPR as a 
criterion for the legality assessment of both the initial order of detention and of the prolongation of 
detention. The Italian supreme court (Corte di Cassazione) quashed the judgment of a Justice of 
Peace (Giudice di Pace) on the grounds of lack of a RPR due to the fact that the detained TCN was a 
stateless person.
85
 
Under the impact of the RD and Kadzoev judgment and ECtHR jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania, carried out an in-depth assessment of the RPR in corroboration 
with the assessment of the due diligence obligation of the administration. The courts require 
documents to be available and if there is no prospect of getting them in the near future, it considers 
detention unreasonable (e.g. case No. A-3078-822/2016, judgment of 23 February 2016). It also 
considers detention unreasonable when the absence of documents from the embassy is the only reason 
for the extension of detention period, such an extension has been held not to be proportionate and 
necessary (case No. A-3219-858/2015, judgment of 22 July 2015). Similarly, the lack of cooperation of 
the embassy of the country of origin of the detained person is a relevant factor for assuming that there 
is no reasonable prospect of removal, according to the Slovakian courts (see Supreme Court, judgment 
9 Sp 33/2013). 
In other cases, CJEU case law does not produce the required effect. For instance, in Hazaka (Syrian 
national), the applicant’s request to be released from detention, since there was no realistic prospect 
for his removal, given the ongoing war in Syria, was rejected by the Cypriot Supreme Court. 
Relying on the CJEU ruling in the case of Arslan, the applicant argued that he ought to be released 
from detention because there is no presumption that he filed an asylum application for the sole reason 
of delaying or averting his return to his country of origin. The Court rejected the application on the 
grounds that the applicant was not covered by the Return Directive since his detention and deportation 
                                                     
81 This jurisprudence has perhaps also developed following the express obligation provided in § 62(3) sentence 4 of the 
German Residence Act. This explicitly prescribes that the initial pre-removal detention will not be permissible if it is 
established that it will be impossible to carry out deportation within the next three months as a result of circumstances for 
which the third-country national is not responsible. See CONTENTION Report on Germany, Q35.1. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), 27. October 2011, V ZB 311/10. 
84 Law no. 161/2014. 
85 Decision no. 19201/2015. 
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resulted from his criminal conviction (travelling with a false passport).
86
 The Czech Supreme 
Administrative Court seems to have a different approach, where the emphasis is on the public 
administration’s requirement to provide reasons why the removal is still possible. The Supreme 
Administrative Court quashed both the judgment of the regional court and the decision of the Police to 
extend detention. The case concerned an Iraqi national, who did not ask for asylum. The Police 
prolonged the decision to detain him for an additional ninety days. The Court criticized the Police that 
it did not justify in detail that removal is indeed possible and that it did not specify where in Iraq the 
third-country national could be safe. Then the Court stressed that if the third-country national does not 
ask for asylum the proceedings to remove him or her are virtually the only possibility where the 
principle of non-refoulement can be assessed (No. 9 Azs 28/2016–31 or 9 Azs 2/2016–71, both dated 
14 April 2016). 
6. Duration of pre-removal detention 
The Return Directive is the first supranational legal instrument expressly prohibiting indefinite pre-
removal detention, and establishing a concrete time period for detention: an initial six months period, 
and exceptionally it can be prolonged to a maximum of eighteen months. Following the El Dridi and 
Kadzoev judgments, the eighteen months maximum duration of the pre-removal detention has been 
widely shared at the domestic level, with national courts generally quashing administrative decisions 
which would exceed this maximum duration. This result is perhaps due also to the clarity of the CJEU 
ruling rejecting any grounds or possibility for exceeding the durations provided by Article 15 RD (see 
more on the concrete impact of El Dridi and Kadzoev in section II). 
7. Prolongation of detention 
Article 15 (6) RD clearly provides that the extension of detention beyond a six-month period is 
possible for a further twelve months only if despite all the reasonable efforts of the Member State 
concerned, the removal operation is likely to last longer owing to: 
a) a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or 
b) delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries. 
The CJEU preliminary ruling in the Kadzoev case confirmed the restrictive interpretation of Article 
15(6) RD, notably excluding any other grounds, whether related to public order or judicial review as 
justifying the prolongation of pre-removal detention (para. 52) As mentioned by the REDIAL 
Research Report 2016/05 (p. 46), Member States still follow in their legislation or practice other 
grounds than those exhaustively provided by the RD. The incompatibility with the RD and its case law 
of such legislation and practice has been remedied to a certain extent by national courts. These have 
refrained from applying national provisions stipulating additional grounds than those provided by 
Article 15(6) RD or have struck down administrative decisions extending pre-removal detention on 
grounds other than those exhaustively provided by the RD. 
One such remarkable judgment comes from the Regional Court of Przemysl from Poland, which 
had to assess, in appeal, the judgment of the first instance court accepting to prolong the pre-removal 
detention of a returnee within six months on the grounds of his submission of a complaint against the 
return decision before the court. In 2014, Polish legislation on immigration was amended for the 
purpose of remedying the lack of suspensive effects of challenges to return decisions. The Polish 
legislator introduced, on the same occasion, a new grounds for the prolongation of pre-removal 
                                                     
86 Re the application of Antoan Hazaka, asylum seeker from Syria and now at the police detention centre in Menoyia with a 
habeas corpus writ, Case No. 110/2013, 19 July 2013, available on: http://cylaw.org/cgi-
bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis/aad/meros_1/2013/1-201307-110-2013..htm&qstring=Antoan%20and%20Hazaka. 
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detention, namely the submission of a complaint against the return decision before the court.
87
 The 
Regional Court raised the issue of the compatibility of this new grounds for the extension of pre-
removal detention provided by Article 403(5) of the 2013 Law on Foreigners with Article 15(6) RD. 
First the Court mentioned that the judicial review grounds is not expressly provided for by Article 
15(6) RD, it then turned to the CJEU case law to understand whether additional grounds, in particular 
judicial review, could be interpreted as falling under the grounds provided by Article 15(6) RD. The 
Court underlined that in Kadzoev, the CJEU expressly rejected the legitimacy of such grounds as the 
basis for the prolongation of pre-removal detention (para. 52). Lodging a complaint against the return 
decision to the court cannot thus be considered a legitimate reason for prolonging pre-removal 
detention. 
After finding a clear incompatibility between the national provisions and Article 15(6) RD as 
interpreted by the CJEU, the Regional Court turned first to the duties of the Member States when 
implementing EU law, and secondly to the duties of national courts as EU courts within the EU legal 
order. Article 2(2) TFEU was cited as establishing a clear obligation for the Member States in 
refraining from actions that would undermine the objectives of the EU and the effet utile of EU law. 
Finding a violation of Poland’s obligations of the correct implementation of EU law, the Regional 
Court continued to assess its duties in cases of incompatibility of national legislation with the RD, 
when the Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations. Relying on the principle of the primacy of 
EU law (Costa v. ENEL) and the International Handelgesselshaft, as confirming the primacy of EU 
law even over national constitutional provisions, the Court held that Article 15(6) RD has precedence 
over provisions of national law which are incompatible. According to the preliminary CJEU ruling in 
the Simmenthal case, national courts are obliged to refrain from applying national provisions which 
are incompatible with EU law. The Court cited El Dridi as grounds for the direct effect of Article 15 
RD, which in casu would require national courts to refrain from prolonging pre-removal detention on 
other grounds then those provided in paragraph 6. Since there were no legal grounds justifying the 
extension of detention, the Regional Court annulled the judgment of the first instance court. 
The powers of national courts to assess the legality of an extension of pre-removal detention varies 
considerably among the Member States. While in Germany courts have full control and they have to 
carry out a new proportionality assessment, being required to quash a detention order or prolongation, 
ex officio, if the reasons for deprivation no longer exist (Sec. 426 (1) sent. 2), in other jurisdictions the 
judicial review powers in cases of prolongation of pre-removal detention were considerably limited to 
checking whether the administration filled boxes on standard forms. The preliminary reference 
procedure has helped national courts to extend judicial control over the facts and laws provided by the 
public administration and thus to bolster judicial control in order to ensure that the RD is correctly 
implemented. Relying on the Mahdi preliminary reference, Article 47 EU Charter, Article 15 RD, and 
Articles 5(4) and 13 ECHR, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court contributed to setting a 
precedent whereby the judicial proceedings on the extension of pre-removal detention is convened in 
an open hearing with the participation of the detained TCN, disregarding the limitations of the national 
legislation (see Kapinga, No. 2724/2010, and Tsiganov, No. 14883/2010, cases). 
Another ground-breaking national judgment leading to the enhancement of detainees procedural 
safeguards comes from the Italian Supreme Court. According to the national legislation, the 
presence of the detained third-country national at the proceedings deciding on the extension of his 
detention was not mandatory. This limitation was reversed by the Supreme Court on the basis of 
Article 3 on the principle of equality and Article 24 on the right of the defence, and RD. Although EU 
                                                     
87 Article 403. 1. “A court of law, in its ruling ordering to place a foreigner in a guarded centre or in a detention centre for 
foreigners, shall indicate the period of stay in a guarded centre or in a detention centre for foreigners, but not more than 3 
months. […] 5. If a foreigner has filed a complaint to the administrative court against the decision on imposing the return 
obligation with a request to stay the execution thereof, the period of stay in a guarded centre or in a detention centre for 
foreigners may be extended to 18 months, yet the court referred to in paragraph 7 may issue a decision on the case for a 
period of 6 months” (see Polish REDIAL Report on pre-removal detention, p. 5). 
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law did not necessarily play the central role, the judgment of the Supreme Court, relying on 
fundamental rights equally protected by both the national Constitution and EU law, ensured both 
objectives pursued by the RD, namely effective removal and respect of human rights (see case ICC, 
judgment No. 4544/2010). 
In conclusion, it is important to underline the role of the lack of cooperation of the third-country 
national in the decision making on the prolongation of pre-removal detention. A majority of Member 
States rely on these grounds for the extension of pre-removal detention. However, not all of the public 
administrations and national courts carry out a careful proportionality assessment and an individual 
assessment to establish the causality relation between the lack of cooperation of the third country 
national and the non-removal during the initial period, a requirement set out by both the CJEU and 
ECtHR. A positive example, even if not necessarily due to the impact of EU or ECHR law, comes 
from the German courts. In the case of a lack to cooperation in the procurement of travel documents 
the competent authorities have to prove that any detention time has been fully used to organise the 
issuance of such documents. The refusal of the due participation of the TCN justifies an extension of 
detention beyond six months only if that refusal is the actual cause for the non-removal. Therefore, a 
potential refusal to cooperate has to be taken into account by the alien authorities in planning and 
organising the process of return, Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 13 October 2011, 5 ZB 126/11. 
8. Re-detention 
The Kadzoev preliminary ruling has had a salient impact on the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania. The Court quashed the judgment of the first instance court 
admitting the re-detention of a third-country national after the expiry of the eighteen months period of 
the initial detention. The fact that the Lithuanian authorities did not receive an answer to their request 
from the embassy of the country of origin regarding the identity of the applicant for more than one 
year could not serve as a sufficient basis for the further detention of the applicant. For those reasons 
the decision of the first instance court was overturned and the application of the Migration Office for 
the applicant’s detention rejected. (Su Hoang Van v. Foreigners Registration Centre case) 
Similar positive integration of CJEU rules can be found in the jurisprudence of the Cypriot 
Supreme Court. That court struck down the practice of the administration of re-detaining after the 
expiry of the initial eighteen month period of detention for similar reasons. In Todorovic,
88
 where the 
immigration authorities issued a fresh detention order and re-arrested the applicant the moment he was 
released by the Cypriot Supreme Court, the Court stated that the fresh issue of the detention and 
deportation order amounted to a clear violation of the provisions of the law transposing the RD and a 
disrespect towards the court’s verdict demanding his release. The Court pointed out that if the 
immigration authorities disputed the correctness of the court’s decision to release the applicant, then 
they should have appealed that decision rather than have issued new orders against him. 
9. Alternative measures to pre-removal detention 
A landmark judgment clearly stating the obligation of the administration to consider alternative 
measures and giving precedence to the Return Directive against incompatible national provisions was 
delivered by the Slovenian Administrative Court. In its judgment (I U 392/2015 of 6 March 2015), 
the Court found Article 81 Aliens Act in violation with Article 15(1) RD because the option of less 
coercive measure could be challenged only after the detention order was issued. The Slovenian 
Administrative Court imposed an obligation upon the police to verify, first, whether alternatives to 
detention might be carried out. The Court described in detail a checklist on how administrative 
                                                     
88 Regarding the application of Zoran Todorovic and Re. the Republic of Cyprus through the Chief of Police and the Minister 
of the Interior, Case No. 2/2014, 7 February 2014. 
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authorities should proceed in imposing restrictive measures (judgment I U 392/2015 of 6 March 2015). 
The Court referred to the Arslan case to highlight “the objective necessity” of a detention measure and 
to the Mahdi case as a basis for the competence of the court deciding on the proportionality of the 
initial detention, but also the prolongation of pre-removal detention (judgment I U 392/2015 of 6 
March 2015). Similarly, the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court requires the courts to 
consider that the issue of granting or the refusal to grant an alternative measure belongs to the 
discretion of the courts, and they may examine it without such a request addressed by the competent 
administrative authorities.
89
 Lithuanian courts have also assigned other alternative measures than those 
requested by the authorities.
90
 
Ground-breaking jurisprudential changes were also reported in Belgium. In 2016, the Brussels 
Indictment Chamber declared a detention measure to be unlawful because the possibility of other 
less coercive measures had not been examined, thus contradicting Article 15(1) of the Return 
Directive.
91
 This approach is in line with the most recent judgment of the Belgian Court of 
Cassation.
92
 Surprisingly though, the Belgian Council and Indictment Chambers continue to prefer 
an older judgment from the Court of Cassation (2009) which rejects the necessity of considering 
alternatives to detention.
93
 
10. Access to legal aid 
According to Article 13(3) RD, third-country nationals subject to return proceedings shall have the 
possibility of obtaining legal advice, representation and, where necessary, linguistic assistance. 
Furthermore, Article 16(2) RD provides that TCN in detention shall be allowed, on request, to 
establish contact with legal representatives. Access to legal aid is not secured for detained third-
country nationals in all stages of pre-removal detention in all Member States (e.g. Slovenia94). Then, 
even when there is legal aid, questions over access to lawyers and the quality of legal representation 
have been raised (see REDIAL Research Report 2016/05, p. 33-34). 
In a ground-breaking judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic 
(SAC) quashed the judgments of both first and appeal courts on the basis of Article 13(3) RD 
requirements. The SAC pointed to the fact that, while transposing Article 13(3) RD into Czech law, 
the legislature failed to sufficiently ensure effective access of TCNs to legal aid or representation. 
Access to legal representation was secured when possible by NGOs. The SAC highlighted that the 
Czech Alien’s Act does not oblige the administrative authorities to ensure the TCNs legal aid. There 
is, therefore, no guarantee that every TCN subject to the return procedure would get legal aid in due 
time. This deficiency is worrying, especially in the case of third-country nationals detained in closed 
facilities.  
                                                     
89 Decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania case No. N143-3565/2008 of 21 July 2008. 
90 See the REDIAL Lithuanian Report on pre-removal detention, p. 8. 
91 See: SAROLEA, S., Le rappel du principe de subsidiarité. Note sous Bruxelles, Ch. mis. en acc., 1er juillet 2016, 
Newsletter EDEM, juin 2016. 
92 See Council Chamber (Brussels), 14 october 2016. 
93 REDIAL Belgian Report on pre-removal detention, p. 10. 
94 The Slovenian Administrative Court attempted to remedy this situation by relying on Article 6 EU Charter, Article 5 (4) 
ECHR, Article 15(2)(a) RD; the jurisprudence of the ECHR: cases Louled Massoud v. Malta, Frasik v. Poland, Kadem v. 
Malta, Khudyakova v. Russia, Rokhlina v. Russia, Rehbock v. Slovenia, Akhadov v. Slovakia, to sustain a constitutionality 
review of Article 79(a)(2) of the Aliens Act, which secured access to free legal aid only in relation to the removal order 
but not also in regard to detention measures. The Slovenian Constitutional Court rejected this claim, arguing that the 
purpose of Article 79(a) of the Aliens Act is not to guarantee the first speedy judicial review, but only an additional 
judicial control in case of extension for more than three months, which does not deprive the detainee of procedural 
safeguards of access to court. See case No. I U 1201/2015-9, judgment of 02 September 2015. 
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The SAC urged the authorities to do as much as possible to achieve the aim expressed in the Return 
Directive at Article 13(3). They were, especially, to make sure that detention facilities are visited 
weekly by lawyers so all third-country nationals have the chance to make their appeals on time. 
Because the competent administrative authorities did not show that the detention facilities effectively 
guaranteed the right to legal assistance, the SAC decided that the applicant (the TCN) was entitled to 
an exception to the obligation to make an appeal within five days. For this reason, the SAC also 
quashed the appellate decision of the defendant and obliged the defendant to deal with the appeal on 
its merits (judgment of the SAC of 30 June 2015, No. 4 Azs 122/2015). 
11. Impact of EU law, CJEU jurisprudence and ECHR on national jurisprudence – summary 
Important changes in national legislation and practice have been prompted by vertical judicial 
interactions on the application of the RD and EU Charter: 
 the amendment of criminal law to exclude criminal imprisonment for irregular third-country 
nationals for mere illegal entry or stay (impact of El Dridi and Achughbabian); 
 bolstering judicial review powers of initial detention orders as well as prolongation of 
detention, and other connected return related measures (impact of Mahdi); 
 limitation of arbitrariness in the application of legal rules, clearly delimitating asylum 
detention from return detention (impact of Kadzoev and Arslan); 
 elimination of public order as grounds for pre-removal detention; reduction of the detention 
period; (Zh and O) 
 introducing the individual assessment of the necessity to detain; (El Dridi and Mahdi) 
 introducing a requirement of clear, reasoned and written decision-making on the part of the 
administration; (principle of good administration and due diligence obligations set out by the 
ECtHR jurisprudence
95
) 
 limiting the grounds for the prolongation of pre-removal detention; (Mahdi) 
 introducing the immediate release from detention after the exhaustion of the eighteen months 
period of detention; (El Dridi) 
 precluding re-detention on the same grounds after the expiry of the eighteen months detention 
period. 
Of course these effects are not evenly spread in all EU countries. As mentioned in this section and 
in more detail in the REDIAL Research Report 2016/05, there are still issues of incompatible national 
legislation or incorrect implementation, which means the divergent implementation of the Return 
Directive. 
However, following the various instances of vertical judicial interactions between national courts 
and the CJEU (see Section II), several issue of non- or bad implementation have been remedied, at 
least to a certain extent. For instance, a list of standards regarding the interpretation and application of 
the abstract EU concept of the ‘risk of absconding’ as legal grounds for pre-removal detention was 
jurisprudentially developed by the CJEU. This has affected the practice of public administrations and 
national courts. These standards clarify, to a certain extent, the general definition of the ‘risk of 
absconding’ provided in Article 3(7) RD: 
                                                     
95 Singh v. the Czech Republic, No. 60538/00, 25 January 2005; Mikolenko v. Estonia, No. 10664/05, 8 October 2009; M. 
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 EU terms which constitute derogation from a principle should be strictly interpreted; (Zh. and 
O, para. 42) 
 Respect of FRs; (Gaydarov, El Dridi) 
 Derogations from the application of the Return Directive cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each MS without any control by EU institutions; (Zh and O, para 48) 
 Genuine and present risk; (Zh and O, para. 50) 
 Consideration should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay; (Mahdi, para. 40) 
 Principle of proportionality should be ensured; (El Dridi, para. 41) 
 Any assessment relating to the risk of the person concerned absconding must be based on the 
individual examination of that person’s case; (Sagor, para. 41, Mahdi, para. 70) 
 No automatic prolongation based on lack of identity documents. (Mahdi, para. 72) 
Mere illegal stay and entry, and lack of identity documents have not been taken, in certain Member 
States, as objective criteria justifying a risk of absconding. Additionally the individual assessment 
requirement is slowly enforced following the judgments of national supreme courts requiring a 
consistent application of this principle by both public administration and courts in cases of pre-
removal detention. The role of national judges is of the utmost importance not only post-preliminary 
ruling, in its application at the national level, but also in the formulation of preliminary references. 
National courts can influence CJEU jurisprudence and determine particular directions of interpretation 
when drafting preliminary questions (see El Dridi, a similar attempt was made in the Celaj case). 
A fundamental change introduced by the Return Directive together with the EU Charter is the fact 
that administrative authorities now have concrete due diligence obligations before and during pre-
removal detention proceedings. Abstract reasoning or “ticking box” forms of justification for pre-
removal detention is generally no longer accepted by national courts. National courts have used 
Articles 41
96
 and 47 EU Charter, and Article 15 RD requirements of written administrative decisions 
and legal and factual motivation of pre-removal detention, as instruments forcing changes in 
administrative practice. The EU Charter, the RD and CJEU jurisprudence are slowly becoming 
standards of legality for national courts in the review of administrative decisions concerning 
immigration detention, even in jurisdictions that, generally, do not refer to European case law (e.g. 
Germany
97
). 
A ground-breaking impact of the CJEU preliminary ruling in the El Dridi case on national 
jurisprudence, could be seen in the judgment of the Tribunal of Crotone (South Italy) in the case of 
Aarrassi, Ababsa, Dhifalli.
98
 This concerned the protests of detained third-country nationals against 
their detention and conditions in the Crotone detention center. This case is worth mentioning due to its 
sensitive and politically difficult issue, which is still present in Italy, but also in the Member States: 
protests of third-country nationals against pre-removal detention lacking in standards of adequate 
motivation, transparency, taken after several years where the individuals resided in the country, and 
was placed in detention centres with difficult living conditions. 
                                                     
96 Appearance of Article 41 EU Charter in the jurisprudence of national courts is slowly increasing, especially in immigration 
cases, where the public administration has a wide margin of discretion, but also, more recently, concrete due diligence 
obligations. Such a case is the one decided by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania ,concerning the repeated 
detention of the person beyond the maximum of eighteen months. The Court established an obligation of due diligence 
for the public administration, derived also from Article 41 of the EU Charter, whereby they could not repeatedly detain a 
foreign national for lack of documents after the expiration of the eighteen-month period, when documents from the 
embassy of the person were not received for more than a year. No. A-3078-822/2016, judgment of 23 February 2016. 
97 See the Decision of 18 February 2016 – V ZB 23/15. 
98 Tribunal of Crotone, judgment of 12 December 2012. 
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These detained third-country nationals were prosecuted for the criminal offences of demolition of 
state property and resistance to police officers, punishable with a prison sentence of one year and eight 
months. The national court centered the legality assessment of the detainees actions and of the 
detention orders, around the requirement that EU law, as interpreted by the CJEU, should be 
respected. The Court recalled that Union law is an integral part of the domestic legal order and that, 
where national law is in conflict with Union law, as is the case with non- or badly transposed 
directives, Union law has supremacy over national law. Article 15 RD was invoked as a directly 
effective provision on the basis of which the legality of detention orders should be assessed. The Court 
then turned to the El Dridi judgment, which was interpreted as requiring national courts to carry out a 
‘least restrictive measure’ test in relation to all detention orders adopted by the administration. The 
Court emphasised that not only must national law comply with Union law, the practices of the public 
administration must also comply with Union law. The Court annulled the detention orders on the 
grounds that they were not properly motivated since they did not provide reasons why “it was not 
possible to concretely apply less coercive measures”, or “why a detention measure was the most 
suitable option to secure an effective removal”. The Court also ruled out the arguments of the Court 
that one of the third-country nationals posed a danger, recalling that the “Directive provides for a 
detention measure only so as to assure the effective removal procedure and cannot be grounded on the 
alleged danger of the person concerned.” (para. 5.7) The Court concluded that the detained third-
country nationals acted in self-defence and ordered their immediate release if they were not being held 
for other – non immigration related – facts. (para. 7) 
It seems that in most of the national jurisdictions, EU law and jurisprudence has had a more direct 
and tangible impact on the national administrative practice and jurisprudence on pre-removal detention 
than the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence. This is true, at least, when it comes to an individual 
assessment of the grounds for detention, time limits of detention periods, establishment of alternative 
measures, and the requirements for clear and reasoned decision-making.
99
 However, in certain 
jurisdictions, the EU Charter is a lesser used instrument and though often invoked by lawyers 
representing detainees it is usually ignored by judges from certain jurisdictions (e.g. Cyprus), who 
prefer to use the more familiar route of the ECHR and its related case law. The ECHR seems to play a 
crucial role when the Return Directive is considered not applicable, for instance in situations of 
criminal imprisonment where there is also an expulsion order in addition to the prison sanction for 
other criminal offences. For instance, Articles 5 and 6 ECHR are invoked as grounds for the release of 
the third-country national, since the administration or/and the first instance court did not take into 
account all the circumstances of the case and that deportation cannot take place in a reasonable period 
of time or that authorities are not acting with due diligence (e.g. Cyprus
100
). 
Another example of national courts relying on the ECHR rather than on EU instruments to secure the 
lawfulness of pre-removal detention is the judgment of the Supreme Court of Italy on the possibility of 
assessing the legality of the expulsion order within the legality assessment of the pre-removal order. 
Relying on Article 5 ECHR, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the Giudice di Pace should 
be able to review the lawfulness of the expulsion order, when validating pre-removal detention, at least 
as regards manifest errors such as violations over the principle of non-refoulement. This change in the 
practice of the Supreme Court has thus resulted in bolstering the judicial control powers of the Giudice di 
Pace on the basis of Article 5 ECHR (Supreme Court, no. 24415 of 30 November 2015). 
In conclusion, the various EU legal instruments (Return Directive, EU Charter, general principles 
of EU law) as interpreted by the CJEU, and the ECHR as interpreted by the ECHR should be read and 
applied in a complementary manner, for the purpose of securing legality of detention measures and 
                                                     
99 Conclusion based on the replies of the REDIAL national academics to the questions introduced in the REDIAL Template 
for assessing the implementation of Chapter IV Return Directive. 
100 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Appeal jurisdiction, Habibi Pour Ali Faysel v. Republic of Cyprus through the Chief of Police 
and the Minister of the Interior, Civil appeal No. 236/15, 31 March 2016. See also Cypriot REDIAL Report. 
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rights protection at the national level. In El Dridi, the CJEU noted that the Return Directive was 
intended to take into account the ECHR and its case law. (para. 43). The higher standards of 
safeguards should be applied, whether provided by the EU and its case law (for instance, the necessity 
and proportionality tests are mandatory in cases of pre-removal detention under the RD, while the 
ECtHR does not set such requirements, see Saadi v. UK), or by the ECHR (e.g. prohibition of 
arbitrariness, in which the requirement of reasonable prospect of removal and due diligence
101
 have 
been developed more in depth by the ECtHR under Article 5(1)(f) and 5(4) ECHR). 
12. Instances of horizontal judicial interactions and their outcome – summary 
Beyond traditional vertical judicial interactions (i.e. the preliminary reference procedure), national 
courts are slowly engaging in horizontal interactions with national courts from other Member States. 
They cite foreign judgments in support of their reasoning. Horizontal judicial interaction seem to 
occur especially in cases where the deciding court’s judgment would have a direct impact on the 
national law (such as invalidating national provisions, or disapplying a national law) or generally on 
national jurisprudence (e.g. changing widespread judicial interpretations, or erroneous judgments of 
supreme courts). 
According to the data submitted by the REDIAL national judges and academics, horizontal judicial 
interactions in the form of the citation of foreign domestic judgments have occurred in the field of 
return proceedings for the purpose of: 1) clarifying EU concepts and their application (usually when 
clarifying the requirements for the application of the ‘risk of absconding’); or for the purpose of 
establishing whether national law or practice is in contrast with EU law. 
As regards the first category of cases, examples came from supreme courts from Cyprus and the 
Czech Republic. In Farak Nessim
102
 the Cypriot Supreme Court referred to two British decisions, 
Walumba Lumba and Kadian Mighty v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC12 
and R (A) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 804 in order to establish 
the criteria for determining whether there is a risk of absconding.  
Another example concerning the clarification of the concept of ‘risk of absconding’ is the Czech 
case over detention based on risk of absconding in the absence of objective criteria set out by national 
legislation. Although also involving vertical judicial interaction, the judgment of the first instance 
court took a ground-breaking decision. The court decided to annul a detention measure in a Dublin 
transfer (the risk of absconding is a legitimate ground for detention under both return proceedings and 
the Dublin system) on the basis of a previous judgment of the German Federal Civil Court (Decision 
of 26/06/2014 – V ZB 31/14 for Dublin cases). The Czech judge was in agreement with the German 
judges that for the risk of absconding to constitute legal grounds for immigration detention, the 
national legislation should have set out objective criteria in national law. In the absence of such a 
transposition, where the Member States have failed to ensure a correct implementation of EU 
secondary legislation, they cannot use the risk of absconding as legitimate grounds for detention. 
As regards the second category of cases, an example came from the Administrative Court of 
Slovenia. This Court referred to the UK case law in its request I U 1201/2015 of 2 September 2015 for 
a constitutionality review of Article 79.a (2) of the Aliens Act. It referred to the judgment of the UK 
Court of Appeal in case no. C4/2015/2134 of 29 July 2015 to support its argument that detention of 
asylum seekers in accelerated procedures is unfair as it does not provide asylum seekers with effective 
access to legal aid. 
                                                     
101 See, for instance, the Opinion of AG Szpunar in the Mahdi case, which cited ECtHR case law on due diligence in order to 
establish the requirements under the RD (para. 90). 
102 Cyprus, Supreme Court, Re the application of Malak Shawki Farak Nessim, Civil application No. 66/2016, 24 August 
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In conclusion, these instances of horizontal judicial interactions, which came from both lower and 
supreme domestic courts, are examples of innovative legal thinking. Perhaps the limited horizontal 
judicial interaction so far is due to a limited access to foreign national jurisprudence and to the concern 
that applicable national law is not similar, though it is implementing the same Directive. By creating a 
national case law database of around 1000 cases on the implementation of the Return Directive, the 
REDIAL Project aims to help national judges to have wider access to foreign domestic courts’ rulings 
for the purpose of offering inspiration on how to apply EU concepts and principles, or to solve legal or 
jurisprudential conflicts, as the cases above show. 
IV. Main Outcomes of Judicial Dialogue on conditions of detention (Article 16 RD): a 
comparative analysis* 
The underlying idea of Article 16 that provides for “appropriate” place and conditions, is that 
returnees, though staying irregularly in EU Member States, are not criminals and do not deserve to be 
treated like ordinary prisoners.
103
 In this regard, Member States are required to guarantee sufficient 
places in “specialised detention facilities” as well as a certain number of concrete safeguards all 
through the detention process. This means ensuring emergency health care and essential treatment of 
illnesses, paying due consideration to the vulnerability of the person, providing relevant and concise 
information, allowing detainees to establish contact with legal representatives, family members and 
competent consular authorities etc. With regard to the place of detention, the “vertical dialogue” that 
took place between the CJEU and the German Federal Courts shows a judicial awareness that foreign 
nationals in the process of being expelled should be treated differently than people convicted of 
criminal offenses. Domestic courts seem now to closely monitor this requirement, otherwise releasing 
the applicants who are held in ordinary prisons and/or together with national or foreign prisoners. 
However, the impact of the CJUE rulings on other national courts appears rather limited: no case law 
has been found in other Member States on the compliance of the administrative practice with the 
Return Directive when it comes to clearly differentiating specialised facilities from criminal custody. 
On the material conditions of detention, more landmark decisions have been uploaded on the 
REDIAL database,
104
 though national courts overall rely on their own legal provisions (see for 
instance, the Spanish Constitutional Court, 17/2013, 31 January 2013). They neither interact with 
European judges (through references for a preliminary ruling), nor with other domestic courts dealing 
with similar issues. In practice, our synthesis reports show that judicial authorities rarely rule 
specifically on the question of whether concrete conditions are or have been respected in detention 
facilities; deficiencies and problems are mainly pointed out by independent monitoring authorities: 
ombudsmen, commissioners, higher administrative bodies etc. As for judicial control, national judges 
either have a limited territorial competence in assessing material conditions,
105
 or have full material 
and territorial competence but seldom strike down administrative detention orders on this basis.
106
 See, 
for instance, Bulgaria, where the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that unless detention 
measures themselves endangered the person’s health, the detention order (or its extension) could not 
                                                     
* Géraldine Renaudiere is the author of sections IV and V. 
103 By contrast, foreign nationals who commit a criminal offence, including in the preparation and the carrying out of the 
removal process, can be detained in ordinary prisons, in accordance with national criminal law. However, from the 
moment the prison sentence comes to an end (when the person should normally be released), Member States are required 
to apply the rules provided by Article 15 RD if they intend to detain the foreign national for removal purposes. See EC, 
Return Handbook, 2015.  
104 To this day, 16 landmark judgments have been collected in database under Article 16 RD.  
105 In Spain, each “Judge of control” is appointed to supervise the conditions of one particular “Centre of Internment” and 
does not rule in general terms (Instruction Judge nº 1 and Control Judge of the Internment Centre in Barcelona “Zona 
Franca”, Dilgencias CIE 35/2014-3, on the obligation to provide clear information to the internees). See also the Spanish 
report on pre-removal detention.  
106 In Slovenia, the extent of the judicial control greatly varies according to the individual judge in charge.  
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be annulled on the sole fact that the room assigned to the detainee was not adapted to his or her 
physical or mental health: SAC, C-8/2016, see Bulgarian Report on pre-removal detention. High 
administrative courts in Greece and in the Czech Republic dismissed individual claims invoking 
material detention conditions contrary to Article 3 ECHR. While acknowledging that inadequate 
conditions may affect the lawfulness of a detention order,
107
 the Czech Supreme Administrative 
Court still considers that aliens cannot expect an “average living standard” as in the Czech Republic 
or in an average hotel in administrative detention. In the Court’s opinion, without going as far as 
prison conditions: “aliens must accept (in detention facilities) a certain discomfort, the absence of 
privacy and the fact that their centre would not be full of entertainment and fun” (SAC, judgment of 
21 January 2016, 2 Azs 300/2015). 
Domestic courts’ assessment of the appropriateness of detention conditions may differ among the 
Member States (supervising authority, scope of competence, extent of judicial control etc.) but this 
aspect remains an inherent part of the control of lawfulness that must be performed by judicial 
authorities with regard to detention orders and/or extension decisions.
108
 As recalled by the CJEU in 
Mahdi, the competent court reviewing the legality of pre-removal detention must be able to: rule on all 
relevant matters of fact and of law (…), replace an initial detention order by an alternative, less 
coercive, measure and release the third-country national where that is justified.
109
 This should be the 
case, for instance, when the person is held in inadequate detention facilities: inadequate with regard to 
his/her status, age, vulnerability. It should also be the case when the conditions of his/her placement 
do not comply with the Directive’s requirements or the international standards.110 With regard to 
families and minors, the Supreme Administrative Court in Czech Republic, explicitly relied on 
ECtHR relevant case law
111
 to quash the judgment of a regional court, which had not sufficiently 
assessed the concrete condition of their detention. However, the SAC did not address the merits itself: 
SAC, No. 1 Azs 39/2015, 17 June 2015, see Czech report on pre-removal detention.  
V. Main Outcomes of Judicial Dialogue on the detention of vulnerable migrants, namely 
families and minors (Article 17 RD): a comparative analysis  
The Court of Justice has interpreted neither the provision on detention of minors and families, nor 
the possible “emergency” situations in the meaning of Article 18 RD. However, judicial interaction on 
this matter would have been useful to avoid some interpretation issues faced in the past by national 
courts dealing with minors accompanying TCNs, notably in France and Czech Republic.  
While in Austria, Germany and Cyprus (since 2014) families with children are almost never 
detained nor held in specialised facilities, other countries’ legislation provide for the possibility of 
placing children and families in separate accommodation from the detention centre in which adults are 
held.  
In France, this physical separation led the Council of State to consider that minors were not 
properly deprived of their liberty (CE, n° 352232, 18 November 2011, see French report on pre-
removal detention). On this basis, lower French courts declined jurisdiction to hear minors who 
challenged a detention order in the light of the “best interests of the child,” arguing that the measure 
                                                     
107 The Court here explicitly refers to ECtHR relevant case law; SUSO MUSA v. MALTA, Appl. No. 42337/12, 23 July 2013, 
§93; POPOV v. FRANCE, Appl. No. 39472/07 39474/07, 19 January 2012, §118.  
108 In the meaning of Article 15(2) and (4) RD. 
109 In casu the court had to deal with an application for an initial period of detention to be extended. CJEU, C-146/14 PPU, 
Mahdi, 5 June 2014.  
110 In this regard, Art. 16 RD should be read in conjunction with recital 17 stating that detainees must be treated in a ‘humane 
and dignified manner’ with respect for their fundamental rights and in compliance with international law. 
111 MUSKHADZHIYEVA ET AUTRES c. BELGIQUE, Appl. 41442/07, 19 January 2010 and POPOV v. FRANCE, Appl. 
39472/07 39474/07, 19 January 2012.  
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impacted only the personal situation of the parents and not the children’s situation: Administrative 
Tribunal of Toulouse, 21 February 2012, see French report on pre-removal detention. By contrast, 
when it comes to adults, the French authorities are required to pay particular attention to the 
foreigner’s personal situation and resort to detention only as a last resort, for a short period, and after 
having examined whether any other credible alternative measures might exist: CAA Nancy, 
14NC01763, 1st October 2015; CAA Bordeaux (1st Chamber), 15 November 2012.  
The same was true in the Czech Republic until 2011, where Judges considered minors under 
fifteen only to be accommodated in separated premises of detention centres. This “legal fiction” led to 
children being unable to challenge their detention before the courts, deemed as formally non-detained 
free to go: see Czech Report on pre-removal detention, p. 25. On 30 September 2011 (in case No. 7 
AS 103/2011) the Supreme Administrative Court departed from this case law. The Court noted that 
despite the lack of an official detention order, the minor had generally no other option than that of 
following his/her parents and staying with them in the detention centre. Hence, it stated that before 
issuing a detention order against the parent concerned, the administrative authority had to consider 
first and foremost the best interests of the child. In the Court’s view, this right should be read in 
conjunction with the right to family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.  
Polish and Lithuanian courts also duly consider the best interest of the child when ordering and 
assessing the lawfulness of a placement, in respectively “guarded” and detention centers: Polish court 
in Slubice, order of 12 June 2014, II.1. Ko 1172/14; Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, Nato 
Pavlenishvili v. State Border Guard Service, 12 February 2015. In some cases, Judges consider 
detention as the best way to ensure the family’s unity and protection. This reasoning can hardly be 
reconciled with the statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights about the 
administrative detention of children. Although not explicitly prohibited by the Return Directive, such a 
measure appears to be, says Mr. Crépeau, a violation of children rights in several ways. And further 
emphasised “detention for administrative purposes can never ever be in the best interest of a child”.112 
VI. Conclusions – main outcomes of judicial interactions in the field of pre-removal 
detention 
Important changes in national legislation and practice (administrative and jurisprudence) have been 
prompted by vertical judicial interactions, inter alia: the amendment of criminal law to exclude 
criminal imprisonment for irregular TCNs for mere illegal entry or stay (impact of El Dridi and 
Achughbabian); bolstering judicial review powers of initial detention orders as well as of prolongation 
of detention, and other connected return related measures (impact of Mahdi); the limitation of 
arbitrariness in the application of legal rules, clearly delimitating asylum detention from return 
detention (impact of Kadzoev and Arslan); and reasoned decision-making by public administration 
(Mahdi). The role of national judges is of utmost importance in both the formulation of preliminary 
references and the implementation of preliminary rulings. National courts can influence CJEU 
jurisprudence and determine particular directions of interpretation when drafting preliminary 
questions, see El Dridi, a similar attempt was sought in the Celaj case. The preliminary rulings 
discussed in Section II have had a transnational impact on both referring and non-referring Member 
States. This is perhaps part of the added value of vertical judicial interaction in the form of preliminary 
ruling(s) compared to horizontal judicial interactions. Although the instances of horizontal judicial 
interaction, with courts citing foreign domestic courts, are fewer than vertical interactions, whether 
                                                     
112 François Crépeau UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Administrative Detention of Children is a Violation of Children’s Rights, UNICEF, 2015. The Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention has also stated that, given the availability of alternatives to detention, it is difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which the detention of an unaccompanied minor would comply with the requirements stipulated 
in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
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direct or indirect, they have triggered ground-breaking changes in practice and in legislation. See, for 
example, the Czech case on the definition of the risk of absconding. 
The definition and application of the ‘risk of absconding’ as legal ground for pre-removal detention 
has been one of the areas of pre-removal detention with numerous judicial interactions. The main 
grounds on which Member States adopt pre-removal detention measures is the “risk of absconding”. 
However, the RD provides a vague formulation of these grounds, leaving a considerable margin of 
interpretation to the Member States when defining objective criteria. Judging by the lack of uniform 
national legal instruments defining this notion, its wide definition and the variety of criteria used to 
define it, the objective of the RD – return detention an exceptional norm governed by precise rules 
written into national legislation – has not been achieved. The open-ended domestic provisions of 
several Member States and the provision of catch-all criteria such as illegal entry or stay raise 
concerns regarding the compatibility of national legislation with the Return Directive (Article 15). 
Furthermore the provision of objective criteria in legal instruments other than domestic laws could 
raise issues of conformity not only with Article 3(7) RD, but also with the ECHR-based requirement 
of legal certainty of domestic norms restricting the right to liberty. 
Either due to the confusing definition of the notion in the RD, and/or the opposition of the Member 
States to changing their domestic practices and the allocation of powers between domestic judiciaries, 
the European legal and jurisprudential framework of pre-removal detention remains fragmented. The 
development of similar and consistent standards in the application of pre-removal detention based on 
the risk of absconding thus falls on the shoulders of national courts. In spite of different national 
competences and the willingness of national courts from EU Member States to control the 
discretionary power of the competent administrative authorities, the REDIAL project underlined a 
developing practice of standardization. This standardization concerned the scope and intensity of 
domestic judicial scrutiny of pre-removal detention among EU countries, thanks to vertical and 
horizontal judicial dialogue. 
Vertical judicial interactions (between European supranational courts and domestic courts) and 
horizontal judicial interactions (among various national courts) have helped national courts to: clarify 
convoluted EU notions, such as ‘the risk of absconding’; and bolster their judicial review power over the 
legality, necessity and proportionality of pre-removal detention. In terms of the long-term impact of the 
judicial interactions, they have contributed to re-shaping national legislation and jurisprudence in conflict 
with the Return Directive, the EU Charter and the ECHR; while re-drawing the division of powers 
between the judiciary and the administration on the adoption and control of pre-removal detention. 
It seems that national courts are increasingly aware of their responsibility of European judges, and 
more inclined to use the principles of individual assessment and proportionality rather than 
automatically endorsing the decision of administrative authorities. Even when objective criteria 
(absconding history, violation of entry ban, failing to cooperate) are invoked by the administrative 
authorities, some national courts do not automatically endorse the administration justification, but 
perform an individual assessment and proportionality test on pre-removal detention (e.g. Sweden, 
Lithuania). However, these standards of review are not yet uniformly shared by national courts across 
the EU Member States, or even within the same Member State (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary). It should be noted that while the CJEU preliminary rulings seem to be generally followed 
in national judicial practice, the REDIAL Research Report 2016/05 and this Electronic Journal have 
shown that there are still persistent objectors among certain national courts, which do not fully endorse 
the mandatory principles of individual assessment, necessity and proportionality and rejection of 
prohibited objective criteria in cases of immigration detention. 
In order to instil more clarity and coherence in the application of EU legal norms and rights, one 
possible solution would be first to remedy the negative consequences of domestic separation of 
judicial competences over the various stages of the return proceedings. For instance, return related 
decisions, pre-removal detention and entry bans usually fall under the competences of different 
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national courts, which have led in practice to unjust solution of return, due to the limited judicial 
powers, or lack of judicial cooperation, and a fragmented judicial review system that delays the 
effective return proceedings. The limited and fragmented judicial review powers cannot be entirely 
remedied by way of single positive judgments. The recommended solution should be a unification of 
the judicial competences over the entire return proceedings included in national legislation, where one 
category of jurisdiction should be competent to review both pre-removal detention and other return-
related decisions. Furthermore the judicial review should follow the minimum standards provided by 
the CJEU in the Mahdi case. In the words of the AG Szpunar in Mahdi, which were endorsed by the 
CJEU, though in a shorter paragraph: 
“the judicial authority must be in a position to determine whether the grounds forming the basis of 
the detention decision are still valid and, as the case may be, whether the conditions for extending 
detention are fulfilled. In order to comply with Article 47 of the Charter, the national court must 
have unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the decision on the merits.”  
Consequently the national courts must be able to decide on: 
 an extension of detention; 
 on replacement of detention by a less coercive measure; or 
 on the release of the person concerned. 
Additionally, “the judicial authority must have power, if necessary, to require the administrative 
authority to provide it with all the material concerning each individual case and to require the third-
country national concerned to submit his observations. […] Consequently it is for the national court 
to assume unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the substance of the case. Thus, as it may apply 
Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 directly it must, if necessary, disregard the provisions of national law 
which have the effect of preventing the assumption of unlimited jurisdiction.”113 
The judgments submitted by REDIAL judges and national academics reveal that, in spite of the 
persistent issues in the implementation of the RD and CJEU case law at national level (see the 
Conclusions of the REDIAL Research Report 2016/05), their effective implementation can be 
significantly enhanced with the help of national judges. Stirred by successful examples of judicial 
interactions, national courts have started to exercise a more extensive and careful assessment of the 
requirements of reasoned decision-making, necessity and proportionality in relation to pre-removal 
detention measures proposed or adopted by public administrations. It is thus important that national 
courts continue this process of coherent and effective implementation, where higher standards of 
human rights are respected. In the words of Bostjan Zalar, one of the REDIAL judges,
114
 in order to 
reach such results the “significant ‘moments’ of horizontal judicial interactions” need to reach larger 
circles of judges. We hope the REDIAL database collecting over 1000 national judgments on the 
implementation of the RD, the European Synthesis Reports and Electronic Journals will facilitate such 
instances of horizontal judicial interaction enhancing effective return proceedings, as well as effective 
rights and remedies for third country nationals subject to such proceedings. 
                                                     
113 Judgments in Simmenthal (106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 21) and Solred (C-347/96, EU:C:1998:87, paragraph 29). 
See also AG Szpunar in Mahdi (ibid.), points 73-79. 
114 See the presentation of Prof. Bostjan Zalar, Judge at the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia and ad hoc 
judge at the European Court of Human Rights during the 2017 OMNIA Conference: “Beyond the crisis” The State of 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in the EU Workshop 2: “Judicial Interactions in Control of Return and Asylum 
Detention”. 
